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CONGRESS, THE INTERNET, AND THE
INTRACTABLE PORNOGRAPHY
PROBLEM: THE CHILD ONLINE
PROTECTION ACT OF 1998
TIMOTHY ZicKt

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1998, sixteen million children under age eighteen were reported to be using the Internet, nearly doubling the number of children reported to be online in 1997. 1 Over six million of these children
were age twelve and under, up from the 3.5 million reported to be online the previous year. 2 One of the perils for children of surfing the
Internet, particularly the World Wide Web, is the proliferation of
"adult" sites on the Web that promote and sell pornographic materials.
There are currently estimated to be over 30,000 such sites, which generate nearly $1 billion in annual revenues. 3 In 1998, it was estimated
that nearly 70% of the traffic on the Web consisted of adult-oriented
material that was unsuitable for children. 4
In real space, the government can create physical and geographical "zones" within communities such that children are denied access to
adult materials and shielded from adult activities. These zones are
effective in real space, where concrete geographical boundaries exist
and where it is possible to verify the age of persons who seek to enter
adult zones. Thus, children can be prohibited from entering adult establishments or from purchasing certain adult goods, such as pornog-

t B.A., 1989, Indiana University; J.D., 1992, Georgetown University Law Center.
Law clerk to the Honorable Levin H. Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The author would like to thank Madeleine Timin
for her helpful comments and careful reading of earlier versions. The author also gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the editorial staff of the Creighton Law Review.
Any errors are the author's alone.
1. The 1997 American Internet User Survey: Realities Beyond the Hype (Apr. 9,
1999) <http://etrg.findsvp.com/interneUfindf.html>. These figures include children online from any location including home, school, libraries, homes of friends, and relatives.
See id. Children use the Internet for a wide variety of activities, including homework,
informal learning, browsing the World Wide Web, playing games, corresponding with
friends by e-mail, placing messages on electronic bulletin boards, and participating in
chat rooms.
2. The 1997 American Internet User Survey, supra note 1, at <http://etrg.findsvp.
com/interneUfindf.html>.
3. See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 6-7 (1998).
4. See id. (citing The Net's Dirty Little Secret: Sex Sells (Upside Publishing Co.,
Apr. 1998)).
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raphy, that are deemed harmful to them. 5 The Supreme Court has
recognized, as part of its First Amendment jurisprudence, that governments can regulate the location - either through concentration or
dispersion - of establishments such as adult movie theaters in order
to alleviate "secondary effects" on the community, like crime and deteriorating property values, and to improve generally the quality of urban life. 6
By comparison, "cyberspace," where many of us now also "live,"
presently contains neither geographical boundaries nor methods by
which users can be instantly and reliably identified. 7 The absence of
geography and identity in cyberspace confounds those who wish to
protect children, as in real space, by creating "red light" cyber-districts, adults-only Web pages, or, indeed, any type of zone based upon
the content of speech posted on the Internet. Information providers
who post material on the Internet cannot yet reliably determine the
age of users who access those materials. Thus, the only certain
method for denying children access to "adult" materials on the Internet is to deny adults such access as well - a significant burden on
the exercise of adults' free speech rights.
Several current projects, including gateway technology, ratings
systems, and domain naming systems, may eventually lead to the replication of the boundary and identity dimensions of real space and create cyber-communities that look something like real space
communities. 8 Should these projects prove workable, it may be possible to create viable adult zones in cyberspace. Without them, or at
least something like them, it will be virtually impossible to transfer
real space zoning principles to cyberspace. In cyberspace, at least in5. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631, 638-39 (1968) (upholding a
state law prohibiting the sale of materials obscene as to minors under 17 years old).
6. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43, 48 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance "prohibiting adult motion picture theaters from locating
within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single-or-multiple-family dwelling, church,
park, or school"); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52-53, 72-73
(1976) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting the operation of any "adult" movie theater,
bookstore, or similar establishments within 1000 feet of any other such establishment,
or within 500 feet of a residential area).
7. According to David R. Johnson and David Post: "Cyberspace has no territorially based boundaries, because the cost and speed of message transmission on the Net is
almost entirely independent of physical location." David R. Johnson & David Post, Law
and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1370 (1996).
Johnson and Post also note: "The Net enables transactions between people who do not
know, and in many cases cannot know, each other's physical location." ld. at 1371.
8. For a proposal for zoning based upon domain name technology, see April Mara
Major, Internet Red Light Districts: A Domain Name Proposal For Regulatory Zoning Of
Obscene Content, 16 J. MARsHALL J. CoMPUTER & INFO. L. 21 (1997). The current trend
toward the "zoning" of cyberspace is discussed by Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1403 (1996).
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sofar as the First Amendment is concerned, it appears that the law,
which generally is accustomed to leading, will, at least for the foreseeable future, have to follow and be guided by technology. 9
The notion that software codes can limit and, in some cases,
trump, legal codes in cyberspace was formally enshrined as a principle
of constitutional law in Reno v. ACLU. 10 In Reno, the Supreme Court
struck down portions of the Communications Decency Act (the "CDA")
under which Congress sought to impose criminal liability on anyone
communicating on the Internet who knowingly distributed "indecent"
or "patently offensive" materials to those under eighteen years of
age. 11 Applying strict scrutiny to the CDA, the Supreme Court held
that while the goal of zoning "indecent" and "patently offensive"
materials was undoubtedly a compelling one, Congress went too far
and too fast in its effort to incorporate real space zoning principles into
the realm of cyberspace. 12 The Court recognized that current technological limitations make it impossible to bar minors'. access to harmful
adult-oriented materials on the Internet without also barring adults
from engaging in constitutionally protected speech. 13 This is so, the
Court reasoned, because current technology cannot duplicate in cyberspace the critical. aspects of geography and identification that are
present in real space. 14 The government, pointing to the almost daily
innovations in user-based blocking software and gateway technology,
urged the Court to recognize that technological innovation was fast
making Internet zoning a realistic solution to the problem of children's
access to cybersmut. 15 Highlighting the unique nature of the Internet
as a medium of free expression and the unprecedented nature of the
government's proposed restrictions on free speech in cyberspace, the
Court, however, refused to uphold Congress' massive zoning effort,
which covered the entire Internet and was backed by the threat of
criminal sanctions, on the mere promise of future technological
advances. 16
9. There are many areas- searches under the Fourth Amendment come readily
to mind - where the government has reaped the benefits of technological advances.
See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that
thermal infrared surveillance is not an unconstitutional search).
10. 521 u.s. 844 (1997).
11. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858-60, 882 (1997).
12. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868, 874-79.
13. ld. at 874, 876.
14. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, offered the most explicit discussion on this point. She focused on the
"twin characteristics of geography and identity" that have enabled effective adult zoning
in real space. Id. at 886, 889 (O'Connor J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
15. Reno, 521 U.S. at 876-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
16. Id. at 849-53, 858-61, 874.
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While technological advances, spurred by market forces, continue
apace, none have undermined Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's observation in Reno that the Internet remains "largely unzoned - and unzoneable."17 Nonetheless, despite the clarity of the Reno Court's
message and the absence of technological advances sufficient to bring
about effective speech zoning on the Internet, in October 1998 Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Child Online Protection
Act ("COPA"). 18 COPA requires, by way of criminal conviction and
heavy civil fines, that those "engaged in the business" of selling materials on the World Wide Web that are "harmful to minors" restrict access to such materials by anyone under the age ofseventeen. 19 COPA
is Congress' latest answer to the "intractable obscenity problem"20
posed by the unique characteristics of the Internet.
Like the CDA, COPA was immediately dismissed by many as little more than election-year pandering to conservative voters. 21 Detractors have variously dubbed COPA "CDAII," "Son of CDA," or "The
Congress Doesn't Understand the Internet Act." COPA, however, is a
far more modest zoning project than the CDA. Unlike the CDA, which
17. Id. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
18. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-31) [herinafter COPA].
19. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)).
20. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Prior to Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973),
in which the Supreme Court set forth the current governing test for "obscenity'' under
the First Amendment, the Court struggled to find a workable solution to the "intractable obscenity problem." See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957). In the
CDA and COPA, Congress has struggled with speech of a different stripe - that which
is not obscene under Miller, but is deemed "harmful to minors" and therefore subject to
regulation.
21. COPA was immediately challenged in court. The day after President Clinton
signed COPA into law, a consortium led by the American Civil Liberties Union filed a
lawsuit in a Pennsylvania federal court challenging COPA, both on its face and as applied, as a violation of the First Amendment. See Complaint, ACLU v. Reno, No. 985591 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1998) (on file with author). The plaintiffs are: The ACLU, Androgyny Books, Inc., d/b/a/ A Different Light Bookstores, American Booksellers Foundation For Free Expression, Artnet Worldwide Corporation, Blackstripe, Addazi, Inc., dlb/
a Condomania, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Privacy Information Center,
Free Speech Media, Internet Content Coalition, OBGYN.Net, Philadelphia Gay News,
Planetout Corporation, Powell's Bookstores, RIOTGRRL, Salon Internet, Inc., and West
Stock, Inc. On November 19, 1998, the district court granted plaintiffs' application for a
temporary restraining order. See Memorandum and Order of Reed, J., ACLU v. Reno,
No. 98-5591 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (on file with author). On February 1, 1999, the district
court held that plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction,
including demonstration of a likelihood of success on the merits, and enjoined enforcement of COPA pending trial. See Memorandum and Order of Reed, J. Reno (No. 985591) (on file with author). Unlike the CDA, which contained a provision allowing expedited appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court, see 47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (Supp.
1998), COPA's fate must be determined through the usual appellate process, including
the Supreme Court's discretionary review. On April2, 1999, the Department of Justice
filed a notice of appeal from the district court's preliminary injunction.
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sought to prohibit "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech from
reaching minors anywhere in cyberspace, COPA was specifically
designed by Congress to regulate and penalize only those who participate in the commercial market for materials deemed obscene with respect to minors in only one of the Internet's many fora- the World
Wide Web. Congress apparently interpreted Reno as an invitation to
·return to the drafting table, and created COPA with what it believed
to be a literal blueprint provided by the Court. 22 Because COPA was
fashioned specifically to address the Court's concerns, it cannot be as
readily dismissed as the CDA.
In Part II of this article, I will examine the current state of Internet technology as it relates to the aspects of geography and identity, the two critical components of effective zoning laws. 23 In doing
so, I will draw on many of the 123 separate findings of fact made by
the three-judge district court panel in Reno v. ACLU. 24 Because Congress enacted COPA specifically to respond to the Reno decision, in
Part III, I will review the ill-fated CDA and the Supreme Court's analysis of Congress' first attempted Internet zoning project. 25 After examining COPA in Part IV, I conclude that despite Congress' narrower
brush, the most recent blueprint it has fashioned for an adult zone on
the Web will not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 26 Indeed, Congress fundamentally misconstrued Reno as an invitation to try. again
to regulate Internet speech. Rather, given the infancy of the Internet,
rapid advances in technology enabling users (i.e., parents) themselves
to zone speech, and the fundamental uncertainty concerning the
shape Internet communities will ultimately assume, the Court's clear
intention was to caution Congress that any content-based restrictions
on Internet speech would likely be struck down.
Nevertheless, if history and politics offer any window to the future, Congress will remain undeterred and COPA will not be its last
Internet zoning project. Thus, in Part V, I will propose an approach to
future legislation that satisfies Congress' need to protect children from
harmful materials on the Internet, while preserving the democratic
nature of the medium and respecting the limitations on zoning imposed by technology and established First Amendment jurisprudence.27 I will argue, however, that the best solution to the Internet's
22. See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 5 (1998) (stating that COPA "has been carefully
drafted to respond to the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997)").
23. See infra notes 28-106 and accompanying text.
24. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-49 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
25. See infra notes 107-96 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 197-299 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 300-09 and accompanying text.
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"intractable pornography problem" is not to impose criminally sanctionable government censorship, but rather for Congress to encourage
the development of technology that allows the adult user (i.e., parent)
to determine what types of cyberspeech should or should not be received in the home.
II.

GEOGRAPHY, IDENTITY, AND THE INTERNET

As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurring and dissenting opinion in Reno, in real space there is no need to question whether "an
adult zone, once created, would succeed in preserving adults' access
while denying minors' access to the regulated speech."2 8 The efficacy
of adult zones in real space can be assumed, because geography and
identity enable proprietors of adult establishments to permit adults to
enter while preventing children, who generally cannot conceal their
age, from coming inside. 29 In addition, legislators can lessen the
chances that children will encounter such establishments by zoning
them away from schools and by concentrating them in areas that children are unlikely to frequent. ao
By contrast, "Netizens" travel the Web 31 rapidly, seamlessly, and
anonymously, often visiting multiple sites whose primary geographical attributes are addresses somewhere in cyberspace and a common
computer code that allows users to access data from their individual
computers. Without perfect computer codes designed to enable precise discrimination in the access to and distribution of speech, regulation of speech in cyberspace is imprecise, and therefore,
constitutionally suspect. Simply put, it is, at least at present, more
clifficult to regulate bytes than atoms. There are no cyber-bouncers or
cyber-proprietors standing at the entrance of adult establishments on
the Internet to restrict access to zones by age. Indeed, although there
are borders in cyberspace, there are as yet no boundaries or walls. 32
28. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 889 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
29. See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J.
869, 886 (1996).
30. As Professor Lessig has pointed out, most of real space is effectively zoned,
whether through legislation or social norms and values. He stated: "In general, you
don't see homeless people wandering through Barneys; you don't see children in bars;
you don't see bars in residential neighborhoods; you don't see houses next to factories."
Lessig, 45 EMORY L.J. at 887 (emphasis omitted).
31. Because COPA seeks only to regulate speech on the World Wide Web, I focus in
this section primarily on that Internet forum. For a full discussion of other Internet
fora, including e-mail and newsgroups, the reader is referred to the detailed findings of
fact made by the district court panel in Reno. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 830-49.
32. See Lessig, The Zone of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. at 1408 ("Borders are not
boundaries; they divide one system from another just as Pennsylvania is divided from
Ohio.").
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Once material is placed in cyberspace, it is available to all who have
access to a computer and modem. These distinctive Internet characteristics pose unique difficulties for erecting content-based zones in
cyberspace that comport with constitutional principles developed in
real space.
A.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE INTERNET

The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network that interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked
computer networks. 33 It is infinite space that plays host to a decentralized, global medium of communications linking people, institutions, corporations, and governments around the world. 34 While
estimates are difficult to confirm, the Internet is currently believed to
connect more than 159 countries and over 100 million users. 35 This
international system of communication allows tens of millions of peousually
ple with access to it to exchange information instantaneously.36
As Professor Lawrence Lessig, a leading commentator on cyberspace law, has noted, what is central about the Internet's present architecture is "the anarchy it preserves."37 No single entity or group of
entities controls the material made available on the Internet or limits,
or is able to limit, the ability of others to access such materials. 38
Rather, the range of digital information available to Internet users is
individually created, maintained, controlled, and located on millions
of separate individual computers around the world. Once an information provider posts its content on the Internet, it has no way to prevent that content from entering any community.3 9 This enables one
who posts information on the Internet to reach a potentially worldwide audience.
33. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
34. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
35. Id. The district court found that "[i)n all, reasonable estimates are that as
many as 40 million people around the world can and do access the enormously flexible
communication Internet medium. That figure is expected to grow to 200 million Internet users by the year 1999." Id. There is some controversy surrounding the estimates of the size of the Internet. See, e.g., D.L. Hoffman, W.D. Kalsbeek & T.P. Novak,
"Internet and Web Use in the United States: Baselines for Commercial Development,"
Communications of the ACM, 36-46 (Dec. 1996).
36. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
37. Lessig, 48 STAN L. REv. at 1408. Professor Lessig has explained that cyberspace is not in a state of pure anarchy. Rather, given the crudeness of the "technologies
of control," cyberspace is "a place of relative freedom" in which "control is exercised
through the ordinary tools of human regulation - through social norms, and social
stigma; through peer pressure, and reward." ld. at 1407.
38. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 853.
39. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844.
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The Internet was designed to be a decentralized, yet linked, network of computers capable of rapidly transmitting communications
without direct human involvement or control. 40 It is comprised of
multiple links between computers and computer networks. Communications sent over this redundant series oflinked computers may travel
any number of routes to their ultimate destination. 41 The Internet
was designed such that these communications could be re-routed if
one or more individual links were damaged or otherwise
unavailable. 42
Those who operate within this primitive architecture or geography utilize a wide variety of methods of communication and information exchange. 43 Among them are one-to-one messaging ("e-mail"),
one-to-many messaging, distributed message databases, real-time
communication, and remote information retrieval (such as the World
Wide Web). 44 Most of these methods of communication can be used to
transmit text, images, data, and sound. 45 The variety of content
posted on the Internet "is as diverse as human thought."46 A significant percentage of that content - perhaps 40% or more - originates
outside the United States. 47
ThE. World Wide Web is currently the most popular way to provide
and retrieve information on the Internet. 48 The Web was created to
serve as the basis for a global, online repository of knowledge, containing information from a variety of sources and accessible to Internet
users around the world. 49 Because all of the computers on which Web
40. Id. at 831.
41. Id. at 831-32.
42. Id. at 831.
43. "Primitive" is used as in the sense of having great potential for the development of a segregated geography much like real space but as yet, no boundaries or distinct communities.
44. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 834.
45. ld.
46. Id. at 842. It is estimated that there are over 320 million pages of content on
Web sites - a "searchable 15-billion word encyclopedia." Steve Lawrence & C. Lee
Giles, Searching the World Wide Web, 280 SciENCE 98-100 (Apr. 3, 1998).
47. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 848. The Internet is an international communications
medium. Many dozens of countries and territories are represented by 242 international
hosts and international participation has been increasing for several years. See Mark
Lottor, Internet Domain Survey July 1998: Distribution by Top-Level Domain Name By
Host Count <www.nw.com/zone/WWW/dist-bynum.html>.
48. Because Congress focused in COPA on regulation of the Web, I will focus in
this section primarily on the geographical and identity characteristics of that forum.
The reader is encouraged to refer to the detailed findings of the district court in Reno
concerning electronic mail, automatic mailing list services, newsgroups, and chat
rooms. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 830-49.
49. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836.
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information is stored are connected to the Internet by the same digital
protocol, all of the information is part of a single body of knowledge. 5°
Physically, then, the Web "is a series of documents stored in different computers" around the world. 51 Anyone with access to the Internet and appropriate software can post content on the Web. The
Web comprises millions of separate but interconnected ''Web sites,"
which in turn may have hundreds of separate "Web pages" that display content provided by particular persons or organizations. 52 Any
Internet user anywhere in the world with the proper software can create her own Web page, view Web pages posted by others, and then
read text, look at images and video, and listen to sounds posted at
these sites.
User-oriented navigation on the Web consists of visiting a series
of Web sites in order to browse or search for a variety of content. To
gain access to the information available on the Web, a person uses a
Web ''browser"- software such as Netscape Navigator, Mosaic, or Internet Explorer- to display, print and download documents that use
hypertext transfer protocol ("http"), the standard Web formatting language. Each document on the Web has an address (much like a telephone number) that allows users to find and retrieve it. 53 Most Web
documents also contain "links" - short sections of text or image that
refer and link to another document. 54 When selected by the user, the
linked document is automatically displayed, wherever in the world it
is actually stored. 55 The Web was designed such that a link is followed with a maximum target time of one tenth of a second. 56
Through the use of these links from one computer to another and from
one document to another, the Web for the first time unifies the diverse
and voluminous information made available by millions of users on
the Internet into a single body of knowledge that can easily be
searched and accessed. 57
While there are no business "districts" on the Web, many organizations and businesses have "home pages" on the Web. 58 These pages
contain a set of links designed to provide information concerning the
50. The protocol is referred to as "W3C." ld.
51. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836.
52. Id.
53. ld. The address is known as a Universal Resource LoCator or "URL."
54. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 837.
57. ld. at 836, 837.
58. Over 10.3 million, or 28%, of the 36.7 million Internet hosts are commercial
domains (.com). See Lottor, supra note 47, at <www.nw.com/zone!WWW/distbynum.html>. As the Internet is changing at such a rapid rate, and because it is not
subject to any centralized authority, it is not possible to know with any assurance the
number of sites that are operated by for-profit ventures.
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organization, and through the links guide the user directly or indirectly to information about or relevant to that organization. 59 Web
publishers60 may allow their Web sites to remain open to the general
pool of all Internet users, or they may close them to all except those
who have advance authorization to enter the site. 61 Many publishers
choose to maintain open sites in order to give their information the
widest possible audience. 62 Should a publisher wish to restrict access
to a site, she must assign specific user names and passwords as a prerequisite to access.sa
As they have with other new media, entrepreneurs are beginning
to explore the business opportunities available on the Web. While it is
not possible to know the precise number of sites that are run by profitmaking ventures, it is estimated that there may be more than one million such enterprises currently operating on the Web.6 4 Like real
space businesses, these cyber-businesses seek to generate revenue in
several ways. Many Web publishers generate revenue through advertising on their sites, much as a magazine publisher will do in real
space. In addition, content providers such as online booksellers, music
stores, and providers of art services allow potential customers to
browse their sites for free- similar to browsing in real space bookstores and art galleries - in the hope that users will purchase goods
on their visit. Finally, some online content providers seek to make a
profit by charging their content contributors, although users still may
access their content for free.s5
59. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836.
60. Information is said to be "published" on the Web when it is made available. ld.
at 837. Publishing "simply requires that the 'publisher' has a computer connected to the
Internet and that the computer is running the W3C server software." Id.
61. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 837.
62. Id.
63. ld.
64. See, e.g., Netcraft Web Server Survey <http://www.netcraft.com/Survey/> (providing data on the growth in Internet web sites).
65. Professor Donna L. Hoffman, who submitted a declaration in support of plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order in the lawsuit challenging COPA and who
testified at the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, stated that
there are five general business models operating on the Web: (1) the Internet presence
model, which involves no direct sales or advertising but is used by a business to raise
customer awareness of the name and products of the Web site operator; (2) the advertiser supported or sponsored model, in which nothing is for sale, content is provided for
free, and advertising on the site is the source of all revenue; (3) the fee based or subscription model in which users are charged a fee before accessing content; (4) the efficiency or effective gains model, by which a company uses the Web to decrease operating
costs; and (5) the online storefront, in which a consumer buys a product or service directly over the Web. Professor Hoffman testified that the most popular business model
on the Web is the advertiser supported or sponsored model, and that the fee based
model was the least popular on the Web. See Memorandum Opinion Granting Preliminary Injunction, ACLU v. Reno, No. 98-5591 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1999).
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The content on the Web is not limited to published documents.
The Web also allows individuals to communicate in discussion groups
and chat rooms and by e-mail using hypertext transfer protocol. Many
Web sites use software applications, sometimes called "middleware,"
to provide users of their sites with access to discussion groups and
chat rooms. Discussion groups allow users of computer networks to
post messages onto a public computerized bulletin board and to read
and respond to messages posted by others in the discussion group.66
Discussion groups have been organized to cover virtually every topic
imaginable.67 Chat rooms allow a user to engage in simultaneous conversations with another user or group of users by typing messages and
reading the messages typed by others participating in the "chat. 1' 68
Online discussion groups and chat rooms create a new global public
forum where individuals can associate and communicate with others
who have common interests, obtain instant answers to research questions, and engage in discussion or debate on an almost limitless variety of topics. 69 It is also possible to set up an account for electronic
mail on the Web. Several commercial Web sites, such as Yahoo and
Hotmail, will provide free e-mail accounts to individuals. These accounts allow individuals to use the Web to create, send, and receive emails with other individuals. Such accounts allow individuals who do
not possess their own computer or Internet access account to establish
a permanent e-mail address and to correspond with other individuals
by using the Web at public libraries and other public Internet access
sites.
B.

IDENTITY AND THE INTERNET

Web browsers, utilizing what Professor Lessig has described as
the "technologies ofprivacy," 70 determine what others will know about
them. As Professor Lessig has written:
One enters cyberspace as one wants. One can enter identifying who one is, or one can hide who one is. One can enter
speaking a language that anyone can understand, or one can
encrypt the language one speaks, so only the intended listeners can understand what one says. What others see of you is
within your control; what others understand of you is within
your control as well. 71
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Reno, 521 U.S. at 851.
ld.
Id. at 851-52.

Id.
Lessig, 45
71. Id.

EMORY

L.J. at 876.
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This is a power different in both degree and character from our ability
as citizens in real space to, on occasion, mask our identities. In cyberspace, we have the ability to hide absolutely who we are. Thus,
"[c]yberspace is a place that maximizes both social and individual
plasticity, which means it is a place that determines very little about
what others must know about you."72
Software technology has not yet managed to alter the fundamental "plasticity" of the Internet. There is currently no effective way to
determine the identity or age of a user who is accessing material
through e-mail, newsgroups, chat rooms, and the like. 73 An e-mail address, for example, provides no authoritative information concerning
the addressee - indeed, some even use e-mail "aliases" to conceal
their identities. 74 Thus, information providers operating in these various fora have no way of knowing the age of those who are consuming
their materials. 75
Technology does exist, however, that allows the operator of a Web
site to interrogate users concerning their identity and age prior to
granting access to a site. 76 An ''html" document can include a fill-inthe blank "form" to request information from a visitor to a Web site. 77
The information collected can then be "transmitted back to the Web
server and be processed by a computer program, usually a Common
Gateway Interface (cgi) script." 78 The cgi script enables a Web server
to process the form and thereby "screen visitors by requesting a credit
card number or adult password." 79 Based upon the information provided, "[t]he Web server could then grant or deny access to the information sought."80
The principal difficulty with an age verification system based
upon cgi script is that it is unavailable to content providers who publish information on the Web through "one of the large commercial online services, such as America Online," because the server software
available to subscribers of these services cannot at present process cgi
scripts. 81 These commercial online services together have nearly
twenty million subscribers. Thus, for a great many Web publishers,
cgi script verification is not a viable option for limiting access to their
Web sites.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at
Reno,
ld.
Reno,
Reno,
Id.
ld.
Id.
Id.
ld. at

877.
929 F. Supp. at 845.
521 U.S. at 855.
929 F. Supp. at 845.

845-46.
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· For those publishers who do not post their material on the Web
through one of the major commercial services, there are several other
difficulties associated with requiring that users provide a credit card
number to gain access to a site. First, there is currently no reliable
method to verify that the card number used is valid prior to allowing a
user to enter a site. 82 Second, even if such technology were available,
age verification by means of credit card would remain economically
and practically unavailable to most non-commercial content providers.83 Verification agencies will not process a credit card unless it accompanies a commercial transaction. 84 Third, using credit card
verification as a surrogate for age would impose significant economic
costs on non-commercial and commercial entities alike. 85 Many commercial establishments operating in cyberspace do not charge - and
do not wish to charge - for access to their speech. Fourth, credit card
verification would substantially alter the presently seamless retrieval
of information on the Internet. 86 Information would no longer be instantaneously accessible to users, who would have to provide a credit
card number each time they wanted to access a particular site containing blocked material. Finally, imposition of a credit card requirement would bar all adults who do not have a credit card- including
many users who are accessing the Internet from locations outside the
United States- from accessing any blocked material. 87
Content providers might also restrict access to their sites by requiring an adult password, access code, or digital certificate to be provided prior to permitting entry. A few commercial enterprises will, for
a fee, verify a user's age and distribute adult passwords or access
codes. 88 These costs are either incurred by users when they apply for
passwords, or are passed along to users by the Web server. Establishing and maintaining an age verification system would impose substantial economic and administrative costs on content providers, who must
purchase and implement the software necessary to screen the passwords, codes, and age certificates, as well as users who must obtain a
82. I d. at 846. Apparently, Vis~ and Mastercard are currently developing software
to make possible the online verification of credit card numbers. I d.
83. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 846.
84. ld.
85. ld.
86. ld. The Reno district court noted that both plaintiffs' expert and the government's expert agreed on this point. The government's expert testified that "people will
not put up with a minute" delay in retrieval. Id. Plaintiffs' expert testified that excessive delay disrupts the "flow" on the Internet and inhibits both "hedonistic" and "goaldirected" browsing. Id.
87. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 846.
88. ld. at 846-47.
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password from one of the commercial services. 89 In addition, many
content providers strive to make their materials available to a wide
audience free of charge, a goal that would be significantly undermined
if age verification is required for access. 9 Finally, because an age verification system would require users to present a credit card or other
form of personal identification over the Internet prior to even entering
a site, many users likely would be discouraged from visiting certain
sites to retrieve information, particularly if those sites are thought to
contain controversial or "indecent" material. 91
There are a number of additional technologically feasible methods
of zoning material on the Internet based upon its content. One such
method; "tagging," would require content providers to label all of their
prohibited. material by imbedding a string of characters, such as
''XXX" for obscene materials, in either the URL92 or HTML.93 For tagging to be effective, content providers would be required to review all
of their online content to determine whether the banned speech appears in any file, and then embed a tag in that file. 94 Once this burdensome task was accomplished, 95 a user could install software on his
or her computer to screen for any tagged material. 96 This process
would, of course, require content providers to make a judgment as to
whether their files contain any of the proscribed speech. Alternatively, "a content provider could tag its entire site."97 Blocking or
screening software - programs designed to be installed on a user's
home computer - could then be utilized to prevent a user from accessing any of the information on the site. To be effective, tagging requires that: (1) content providers agree on what speech is prohibited,

°

89. Id. at 847. The district court noted that "[t)here was testimony that the costs
would be prohibitive even for a commercial entity such as HotWired, the online version
of Wired magazine." I d.
90. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 847.
91. Id. Commercial information providers, many of whom seek to make a profit
from advertising revenues, obviously depend upon the largest possible audience being
permitted to enter their sites. As the district court noted, "[t)here is concern by commercial content providers that age verification requirements would decrease advertising
and revenue because advertisers depend on a demonstration that the sites are widely
available and frequently visited." Id.
92. A Universal Resource Locator ("URL") is the address for a particular Web site.
93. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 847. HTML is the common information storage format by which the Web links together disparate information.
94. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 847.
95. Id. The district court noted that the Carnegie Library, for example, "would be
required to hire numerous additional employees" to screen its entire online content for
arguably prohibited speech. Id. The court found that "[t)he cost and effort would be
substantial for the Library and frequently prohibitive for others." Id.
96. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 847.
97. ld. at 848.
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and (2) blocking software currently exist that can recognize an agreedupon tag.98 Neither of these requirements can currently be met. 99
Another potential publisher-based solution to the identity problem is Domain Name System ("DNS") zoning. Currently, any size network can join the Internet by applying for membership in two domain
hierarchies: organizational and geographical. 100 The organizational
hierarchy is divided into seven so-called "top-level" domains. 101 For
example, commercial sites are required to register with Network Solutions, Inc. in the ".com" top-level domain. DNS enables each domain
to be administered by a different organization. 102 There are currently
several proposals to create a generic top-level domain on the Internet
that would be specifically reserved for adult content. 103 For example,
sites that contain adult material might be placed in a new domain
such as ".adult" or ".xxx." It would then be incumbent upon software
manufacturers to develop blocking software to deny access to all sites
in the new domain. Of course, as with tagging, this potential solution
would require that judgments be made concerning whether the content of a site requires that it be located within the new domain and
would further require that software be developed to block sites based
upon the new domain names.
There are also a number of promising blocking or filtering techniques currently available that allow the user to decide what type of
content he or she will allow to be accessed from a computer. These
techniques vary: they can be as simple as stand-alone software that
blocks access to particular sites or as complicated as software programs that review each page of material posted on the Web based on a
set of key words. 104 As already mentioned, some blocking technology
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Major, 16 J. MARsHALL J. CoMPUTER & INFO. L. at 24.
101. The seven top-level domains are: (1)" .com," (2) ".edu," (3) ".gov," (4) ".mil," (5)
".int," (6) ".net," and (7) ".org." Id.
102. See Major, 16 J. MARsHALL J. CoMPUTER & INFO. L. at 25-29. On November 25,
1998, the Department of Commerce and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers ("ICANN") signed a memorandum of understanding in which they agreed
to transfer responsibility for the Internet domain names system from the United States
government to a recently created private non-profit corporation. (The MOA is located at
www.ntia.doc.gov.). The agreement calls for Commerce and ICANN to, among other
things, oversee policy established for determining whether new generic top-level domains should be added.
103. See Major, 16 J. MARsHALL J. CoMPUTER & INFO. L. at 25-29.
104. In Reno, the court noted that "[t]he World Wide Web Consortium has launched
the PICS ('Platform for Internet Content Selection') program in order to develop technical standards that would support parents' ability to filter and screen material that their
children see on the Web." Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 838. The Consortium expects that
PICS will allow third parties, as well as individual publishers, to rate content on the
Internet. See id.
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can be used in conjunction with the "tagging'' and DNS methods. The
chief difficulty with the current blocking software is that it may screen
too broadly for "indecent" materials - screening for ''breast," for example, may result in the blocking of useful information on breast cancer. Parental control software also cannot currently screen for
sexually explicit images unaccompanied by suggestive text. 105 Nevertheless, despite these limitations, "currently available user-based
software suggests that a reasonably effective method by which parents
can prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit and other
material which parents may believe is inappropriate for their children
will soon be widely available." 1 06
III. ROUND I: THE COMMUNICATIONS DEQENCY ACT
("CDA")
In years past, the Supreme Court has examined government restrictions on speech in a variety of media contexts, including radio, 1 07
newspapers, 108 telephones,1°9 and cable television. 11 o In Reno v.
ACLU, 111 the Court addressed for the first time the constitutionality
of governmental regulation of speech in the context of what it called
"the vast democratic fora of the Internet." 112 Its examination was precipitated by a challenge to two provisions of the CDA whereby Congress sought to protect minors from "indecent" and "patently
offensive" material on the Internet, and was informed by extensive
findings of fact made by a three-judge district court panel, many of
which were discussed in Part II, concerning the Internet and the current state of cyberspace technology. 113 As Congress apparently read
Reno quite literally as a blueprint for erecting a constitutional adult
cyberzone, and because determination of the constitutionality of
COPA will turn in large part on application of the Reno decision, I
105. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 842.
106. ld.
107. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729, 750-51 (1978) (upholding an
FCC regulation of the broadcast of a "Filthy Words" monologue).
108. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (allowing criticism of public officials to be regulated by civil libel only if the plaintiff shows actual
malice).
109. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (upholding prohibition of obscene "dial-a-porn" messages).
110. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737,
768 (1996) (upholding an FCC order permitting an operator to prohibit patently offensive or indecent programming on leased access channels).
111. 521 u.s. 844 (1997).
112. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-69 (1997).
113. Reno, 521 U.S. at 849-61. The findings were in large part the result of a detailed stipulation prepared by the parties. Id. at 849.
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examine closely in this Part the CDA and the Supreme Court's analysis of that statute.
A.

THE CDA's

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The CDA had a less-than-impressive legislative pedigree. Inserted as Title V of The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 114 its provisions were, as the Supreme Court noted, "either added in executive
committee after the hearings were concluded or as amendments offered during floor debate on the legislation."115 No hearings were held
on the two provisions that became law and were subsequently challenged in Reno.ll6
The first provision of the CDA challenged in Reno prohibited the
knowing transmission by means of any "telecommunications device"
over the Internet of "obscene or indecent" messages to any recipient
under eighteen years of age. 117 The statute did not define "indecent"
in any respect. Violation of this provision carried penalties of imprisonment of no more than two years or a fine, or both. 118
The second CDA provision prohibited knowingly sending or displaying over the Internet, by means of an interactive computer service, "patently offensive" messages in a manner that is available to a
114. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 501-61, 110 Stat. 56,
133-43.
115. Reno, 521 U.S. at 858.
116. ld. at 858 n.24.
117. ld. at 859; Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681
(1998) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(l)-(2)) [herinafter COPA). Section 223(a)
provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever in interstate or foreign communications -

***

(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly (i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication
is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the communication;

****

(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be
used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used
for such activity,
shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
!d.
118. Reno, 512 U.S. at 859. Appellees did "not challenge the application of the statute to obscene speech," which, the Court noted, is subject to absolute ban. ld. at 833.
Thus, the Court severed the "or indecent" portion of the statute from the prohibition on
"obscene" communications.
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person under eighteen years of age. 119 The statute did not define
which "community standards" - whether of the local community,
some broader "community" of Internet users, or some other national
standard - would be applied in determining whether speech was considered "patently offensive." 120 Violation of this provision also carried
criminal penalties.
The CDA provisions applied broadly to the entire universe of
cyberspace, including e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups, chat rooms,
and the World Wide Web. They were qualified, however, by two affirmative defenses. 121 The first defense was broadly worded; it allowed those who took "good faith, reasonable, effective, and
appropriate actions" that were "feasible under available technology" to
restrict access by minors to the prohibited communications to escape
conviction. 122 The second defense specifically covered those who restricted access to "indecent" or "patently offensive" material by requiring certain designated forms of age proof, such as a verified credit card
119. Reno, 521 U.S. at 859; COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)). Section
223(d) provides:
(d) Whoever (1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly (A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons
under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a
person under 18 years of age,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user or such service placed the call or initiated
the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's
control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent
that it be used for such activity,
shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id.
120. Reno, 521 U.S. at 873-74. The phrase "patently offensive" was "qualified only
to the extent that it involve(d] 'sexual or excretory activities or organs' taken 'in context'
and 'measured by contemporary community standards.'" See id. at 874 n.35; COPA (to
be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(B)).
121. The defenses, set forth in section 223(e)(5) of COPA provide in full:
(5) It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(1)(B) or (d) of this section, or under subsection (a)(2) of this section with respect to the use of a facility for an activity under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section that a person(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions
under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication specified in such subsections, which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such communications, including any method which
is feasible under available technology; or
(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use of a verified
credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification
number.
COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)).
122. See COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A)).
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or an adult identification number or code. 123 Persons utilizing one or
more of these forms of identification also would escape conviction
under the CDA. 124
B.

STRICT ScRUTINY FoR INTERNET SPEECH RESTRICTIONS

Fifty years ago, Justice Robert H. Jackson recognized that "[t]he
moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the
sound truck and the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each . . . is a law unto itself."125 The
Supreme Court has long employed differential treatment of the mass
media under the First Amendment, adjusting the level of scrutiny to
suit the special features of the medium under consideration. 126
Applying this medium-specific approach, the Reno Court had little
difficulty settling on strict scrutiny for the CDA, which requires that
speech restrictions be justified by "compelling" governmental interests
and "narrowly tailored" to effectuate those interests. 127 Reviewing its
precedents involving other media, the Court concluded that the
unique factors that had led it on occasion to qualify the level of First
Amendment scrutiny - including a history of government regulation,128 scarcity of available frequencies at inception, 129 and the invasive nature of the media 130 - are not present in cyberspace. 131 The
Internet, the Court noted, has never been regulated, has no scarcity of
outlets for speech, and is a user-driven medium of expression that requires users to take several affirmative steps before content appears
on a computer screen. 132 The Court recognized that the Internet had
123. See id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(B)).
124. Reno, 521 U.S. at 881.
125. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
126. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637, 661-64 (1994) ("it
is true that our cases have permitted more intrusive regulation of broadcast speakers
than of speakers in other media."); Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748 ("We have long
recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment
problems.").
The Court has established different rules for print (Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)), broadcast radio and television (Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)), cable television (Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 661-62), billboards (Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (plurality opinion)), and drive-in movie theaters (Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206
(1975)).
127. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868; Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 641-42; Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991).
128. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868 (citing Red Lion Broad., 395 U.S. ·at 399-400).
129. ld. (citing Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 637-38).
130. Id. (citing Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 128).
131. Id. at 868.
132. Id. at 854, 868-69.
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become a powerful new "marketplace of ideas" that was dramatically
expanding in the absence of government regulation. 133
The Court also was plainly disturbed by the breadth and unprecedented nature of the CDA's speech restrictions. 134 The Court noted
that the CDA's scope was not limited to "commercial speech or commercial entities."135 The Court rejected the Government's argument
that the CDA was a constitutional form of "cyberzoning" on the Internet, similar to government efforts in real space to isolate and disperse adult establishments, 136 noting that the CDA applied broadly to
communications made in any of the "vast democratic forums of the
lnternet." 137 In addition, the Court distinguished the CDA from efforts in real space to use zoning laws to disperse or concentrate adult
establishments on the ground that, unlike real space zoning laws,
which seek to ameliorate the secondary effects associated with the proscribed speech, the CDA was designed to protect children from the primary effects of "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech. 138 The
Court characterized the CDA as "a content-based blanket restriction
on speech," and not a mere time, place, and manner regulation. 139
Thus, the Court determined that its precedents applying lesser scrutiny to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions 140 did not provide any basis for applying less demanding scrutiny to the CDA's
provisions.
C.

TECHNOLOGY, TAILORING, AND OVERBREADTH

Applying strict scrutiny, the Reno Court held that the CDA's
prohibitions on "patently offensive" and "indecent" Internet communications were not narrowly tailored and were unconstitutionally overbroad.141 The Court recognized, as it had many times in the past, that
the government's interest in protecting children from harmful speech
133. Id. at 868-69, 885.
134. ld. at 887.
135. ld.
136. ld. at 867-68.
137. Id. at 686-69.
138. Id. at 867-68 (emphasis added); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 49 (1986) (discussing secondary effects of adult movie theaters).
139. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868.
140. I d. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) ("A restriction that regulates only the time, place, or
manner of speech may be imposed so long as it is reasonable.").
141. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868. Under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a
law must be struck down if it would "penalize a substantial amount of speech that is
constitutionally protected ... even if some applications would be constitutionally unobjectionable." Forsyth County Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992).
The doctrine of substantial overbreadth arose to permit facial challenges to laws that
might have some permissible applications but that threaten a substantial quantity of
constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
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is a compelling one. 142 However, the Court explained, the government's interest in protecting children "does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults." 143 As the Court
has explained in several cases involving speech restrictions in other
media contexts, most recently with regard to proposed regulations of
cable television content, "the Government may not 'reduc[e] the adult
population ... to ... only what is fit for children."' 144
The Court's conclusion that the CDA would result in an unnecessarily broad suppression of protected speech was based primarily upon
the findings of the district court concerning the current state of cyberspace technology, as described in Part II of this article. 145 The Court
relied upon the district court's conclusion that current software technology does not provide an effective means by which to determine the
age of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders,
newsgroups, or chat rooms. 146 The Court also observed that, as a
practical matter, "it would be prohibitively expensive for noncommercial- as well as some commercial- speakers who have Web sites to
verify that their users are adults." 147 Thus, the Court concluded that
the CDA was not narrowly tailored, because "existing technology did
not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from
obtaining access to communications on the Internet without also denying access to adults." 148 Further, the Court was not convinced that a
broad government-mandated curtailment of speech was necessary or
desirable given the variety of more narrowly tailored and currently
available user-based software applications that enable parents to prevent their children from accessing materials on the Internet that they
believe are inappropriate.149
The Court also determined that, given the amount of constitutionally protected speech that would fall within the CDA's "patently offensive" and "indecent" categories, the CDA was unconstitutionally
overbroad. The government sought refuge from the CDA's over491, 504 (1985). The doctrine has been applied in particular where the law regulating
speech is criminal in nature. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
142. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 875. As the Court stated in New York v. Ferber: "It is
evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling." New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,
607 (1982)).
143. Reno, 521 U.S. at 875.
144. Id. (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 759 (1996) (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 128)).
145. Id. at 874-77; see supra notes 28-106 and accompanying text.
146. Reno, 521 U.S. at 876.
147. Id. at 876-77.
148. ld. at 876, 879.
149. ld. at 877-79; supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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breadth problems in the statute's affirmative defenses. 150 It urged the
Court to hold that "tagging," for example, was a "good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate" action that would provide an affirmative defense to conviction under the CDA. 151 However, the Supreme
Court disagreed that the tagging proposal would, or even could, be
"effective" given the current state of technology. 152 The Court noted
the government's acknowledgment that the screening software necessary to utilize tagging does not yet exist. 1 53 Even if such technology
were available, the Court concluded that there is no way to ensure
that a recipient of information would be using it. 154 Thus, the information provider could not rely upon its tagging to be "effective." 155
Similarly, the Court concluded that the affirmative defenses
based upon restricting access to materials by means of verified credit
cards or adult passwords did not significantly limit the scope of the
CDA's speech restrictions. 156 The Court acknowledged that such verification methods were actually used by some "commercial providers of
sexually explicit material," and that these providers would receive the
benefit of an affirmative defense. 157 However, the Court cited the district court's finding that "noncommercial speakers" could not avail
themselves of this defense, because it was not economically feasible
for most of them to do so. 158 Even with respect to "commercial" speakers, the Court noted that the government had presented no evidence
that currently available verification methods actually would preclude
minors from accessing the prohibited speech. 159
Ultimately, the Court concluded that currently available software
technology could not bear the weight the government placed upon it.
The technological void led the Court to determine that the CDA swept
broadly while allowing Internet speakers little or no chance to comply
with its mandates. 16 Further, the Court was not willing to rely upon
the government's optimistic prediction that future technological advances would provide meaningful defenses to the CDA's prohibitions,
which carried severe criminal penalties. 161 In the end, the Court held
that the speech restrictions in the CDA were so broad, and would re-

°

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Reno,
Id.
ld.
Id.
Id.
ld.
Id. at
Id. at
ld.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

521 U.S. at 879-81.

881-82.
881.
882.
878-82.
881-82.
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quire that so much permissible speech be restricted, that they
amounted to "'burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.'" 162 Indeed, the
Court observed, the CDA was far more dangerous to free speech than
other speech-restrictive statutes the Court had invalidated - it
"threaten[ed] to torch a large segment of the Internet community." 163
Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part, authored an opinion to explain that she viewed the CDA as "little more
than an attempt by Congress to create 'adult zones' on the Intemet."164 She rejected the CDA, because it strayed "from the
blueprint our prior cases have developed for constructing a 'zoning
law' that passes constitutional muster." 165 Specifically, Justice
O'Connor noted that the Court had previously upheld zoning laws: (1)
if they did not unduly restrict adult access to constitutionally protected material, and (2) so long as minors have no First Amendment
right to view the prohibited material. 166 She agreed with the majority
that technological limitations, as they existed in 1997, caused the
CDA to fail the first of these limiting principles. 167
D.

DISTINGUISHING REAL SPACE PRECEDENTS

The Court readily distinguished the CDA provisions from speech
restrictions it had held were permissible in real space. As I will explain in Part IV, in drafting COPA Congress erred by reading these
distinctions too literally, while it ignored the more general reservations articulated by the Court with respect to regulation of Internet
speech. 168
In Ginsberg v. New York/ 69 the Court upheld a New York statute
that prohibited the sale to minors under seventeen years of age of
materials deemed obscene as to such minors even if the same materials were not obscene as to adults. 170 Ginsberg, the proprietor of a
lunch counter where certain magazines were also sold, was prosecuted
162. ld. at 882 (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 127).
163. ld.
164. Id. at 886 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
165. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
166. Id. at 888 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
167. Id. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
168. See infra notes 218-55 and accompanying text.
169. 390 u.s. 629 (1968).
170. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633, 648 (1968). The Court explained in
Ginsberg that material is obscene as to minors if it: (1) is "patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors;" (2) appeals to the prurient interest of minors; and (3) is "utterly without
redeeming social importance for minors." Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633 (citations omitted).
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after he sold several "girlie" magazines to a sixteen-year-old
customer. 171
The Reno Court distinguished the statute upheld in Ginsberg
from the CDA on four separate grounds. 1 7 2 First, the Court noted
that the New York statute, unlike the CDA, did not prohibit parents
from purchasing obscene materials for their children should they wish
to do soP3 This aspect of the New York law was consistent with the
respect the Court has long afforded the principle that "the parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their
children is basic in the structure of our society ." 174 Second, the Court
noted that "the New York statute applied only to commercial transactions," while the CDA reached all communications within the prohibited categories transmitted on the Internet. 175 Third, unlike the CDA,
the New York ban on obscene material was limited to material that
was "utterly without redeeming social importance for minors." 176
Fourth, the Court noted that the New York statute was somewhat
more narrow in scope than the CDA, in that it defined a minor as a
person not yet seventeen years old, whereas the CDA included all
those who were under eighteen years of age. 177
Justice O'Connor's critique of the CDA was somewhat different.
She distinguished the statute at issue in Ginsberg from the CDA on
the ground that the former "operated in the physical world, a world
with two characteristics that make it possible to create 'adult zones:
geography and identity.'" 178 Thus, while the Ginsberg Court could
simply assume that the adult zone created by the New York statute
"would succeed in preserving adults' access while denying minors' access to the regulated speech," the Court could not make such an as171. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631. The New York statute provided that it was an affirmative defense that (a) the defendant "had reasonable cause to believe that the minor
involved was seventeen years or more;" and (b) such minor "exhibited to the defendant a
draft card, driver's license, birth certificate or other official or apparently official document purporting to establish that such minor was seventeen years old or more." N.Y.
PENAL LAw§ 484-h (McKinney 1909). Ginsberg apparently did not assert that the affirmative defenses applied in his case. Thus, the Court had no occasion to comment on
them.
172. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865.
173. Id.
174. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder.").
175. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865.
176. ld. (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646).
177. Id. at 865-66.
178. Id. at 889 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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sumption with respect to the CDA, which operated in a world devoid of
the "twin characteristics" of "geography and identity."179
The Court also distinguished FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 180 in
which it upheld a declaratory order issued by the FCC that a twelveminute "Filthy Words" monologue that repeatedly used "certain words
referring to excretory or sexual activities or organs" was "indecent"
and "patently offensive" as broadcast and could be prohibited from radio airwaves during afternoon hours when children are likely to be in
the audience. 181 In Reno, the Court distinguished the order upheld in
Pacifica from the CDA on the ground that the FCC order was "issued
by an agency that had been regulating radio stations for decades [and]
targeted a specific broadcast that represented a rather dramatic departure from traditional program content in order to designate when
-rather than whether- it would be permissible to air such a program in that particular medium." 182 By contrast, the CDA's prohibitions were not limited to particular times and were not dependent
upon any evaluation by an agency or other body familiar with the
unique aspects of the Internet. 183 The Court also noted that, unlike
the CDA, the FCC's order was not punitive in nature. 184 Finally, the
Court noted that radio had traditionally received the most limited
First Amendment protection "in large part because warnings could not
adequately protect the listener from unexpected program content." 185
Relying on the findings of the district court, the Supreme Court explained that the Internet was significantly different from other media
in this regard. The Court accepted the district court's findings that
the Internet is not an invasive medium and materials generally do not
take users by surprise. 186 Indeed, the Court noted that the district
court had found that "the risk of encountering indecent material by
accident is remote because a series of affirmative steps is required to
access specific .material. "187
E.

THE VAGUENESS OF THE

CDA

In addition to urging the Court to invalidate the CDA on overbreadth grounds, the plaintiffs also argued that the CDA was too
vague to support a criminal prosecution and hence violated the Fifth
179.
180.
181.
(1978)).
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
438 u.s. 726 (1978).
Reno, 521 U.S. at 866 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 730, 735
Id. at 867.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748).
ld. at 867.
Id.
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Amendment. 188 The Court declined to invalidate the CDA on this alternative ground. 189 However, it expressed concern that "the many
ambiguities concerning the scope of [the CDA's] coverage render it
problematic for purposes of the First Amendment." 190
The Court's concern that the CDA was unconstitutionally vague
centered upon the amorphous nature of the category of speech the
CDA purported to prohibit. The Court noted the absence of any definition for the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive," and the resulting confusion concerning how the standards related to each other. 191
In addition, the Court rejected the government's argument that because the CDA's "patently offensive" provision contained one of the
prongs set forth in Miller v. California 192 - that material be "patently offensive" as defined by state law - it could not be deemed unconstitutionally vague. 193 To the contrary, the Court reasoned that
Miller had added to the "patently offensive" standard a requirement
that the material at issue be "specifically defined by the applicable
state law," a requirement that was lacking in the CDA. 194 In addition, the Court stated that the inclusion of one part of the three-prong
Miller test for obscenity did not necessarily save the CDA. 195 The
Court noted that the two requirements that the government left out of
the statute - that the material, ta:ken as a whole, appeal to the "prurient interest," and that it lack "serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value" - substantially limited the scope of the obscenity
definition. 1 96

188. Reno, 521 U.S. at 861. The Supreme Court has stated that criminal statutes
should be construed with utmost care for clarity, because "[n]o one may be required at
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes, and this
is particularly true of laws having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech." Hynes v.
Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976) (quoting, in part, Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959)).
189. Reno, 521 U.S. at 864.
190. Id. at 870.
191. ld. at 871.
192. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Court established the following test for determining whether material is obscene:
(a) whether the average person applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 872 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
193. Reno, 521 U.S. at 872-73.
194. ld. at 873 (citations omitted).
195. ld.
196. ld.
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ROUND II: THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT OF
1998 ("COPA")

It did not take Congress long after the Supreme Court invalidated
the CDA to enact its second content-based restriction on Internet
speech. Despite the serious reservations of his own Department of
Justice, 197 President Clinton signed COPA into law on October 21,
1998, approximately fourteen months after the Supreme Court's Reno
decision. As with the CDA, it did not take the courts long to block
Congress's latest effort to construct a speech zone on the Internet. On
February 1, 1999, a federal district court in Pennsylvania preliminarily enjoined enforcement of COPA pending .a trial on the merits. 198
The speed with which Congress acted in passing COPA prevented
it from deliberating at length the merits ·of its second Internet zoning
project. As a result, COPA has a legislative pedigree only slightly
more impressive than that of the CDA. Like the CDA, COPA was appended to a far more substantial legislative enactment; the law was
tucked into the 5000-plus page Omnibus Budget Bill of 1998. Perhaps
sensing the Supreme Court's frustration with the apparent lack of
forethought that preceded passage of the CDA, Congress held two
hearings prior to passing COPA that addressed the ease with which
children can access pornography on the Internet and the need for a
congressional response to this problem.199
197. In a letter dated October 5, 1998, addressed to Representative Thomas Bliley,
Chairman of the House Committee on Commerce, the Justice Department set forth its
views concerning COPA. See 144 Cong. Rec. S12796-98 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (letter
from L. Anthony Sutin, Acting Assistant Attorney General). In the letter, the Department expressed several concerns. First, the Department worried that COPA "could require an undesirable diversion of critical investigative and prosecutorial resources that
the Department currently invests in combating traffickers in hard-core child pornography, in thwarting child predators, and in prosecuting large-scale and multidistrict commercial distributors of obscene materials." ld. at S12796. Second, the Department
expressed doubt as to whether COPA "would have a material effect in limiting minors'
access to harmful materials," because the thousands ofnewsgroups and other Internet
fora on which children can access pornography as well as overseas Web sites would not
be affected by the law. I d. Third, the Department warned that COPA might not survive
strict scrutiny, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's treatment of the CDA in
Reno. Id. at S12797. Fourth, and finally, the Department opined that COPA "contains
numerous ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage." Id.
198. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
199. Hearings were held by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation on February 10, 1998, and by the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Committee on Commerce on September 11, 1998. See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 20 (1998). In the latter hearing,
Congress received testimony from, among others, a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the executive director of the Free Speech Coalition, representatives of various Internet security organizations, Professor Larry Lessig of Harvard Law
School, and a professor of psychology.
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A. THE COPA WEB ZONE
The Reno Court held that Congress had overreached with the
CDA primarily because the statute's speech restrictions threatened a
substantial portion of the Internet community with criminal prosecution.200 In COPA, Congress sought to construct a narrower zone of
restricted speech.
COPA's proposed zone is narrower than the CDA in several respects. It extends only to certain types of speech made on the World
Wide Web, and does not cover the entire Internet, as did the CDA.
The targeted speech is that which is deemed to include content "harmful to minors" - a phrase defined with specific reference to the Miller
test. COPA would prohibit Web publishers who seek to make a profit
from distributing ''harmful" materials on the Web to anyone under age
seventeen. In order to enforce this prohibition, Congress utilized the
same approach it had adopted in the CDA- prohibited communications are subject to heavy civil and criminal penalties, unless a Web
publisher is protected from conviction by one of the statute's affirmative defenses, which are discussed below in Part IV(A)(2). 201
More specifically, COPA imposes criminal and civil penalties on
anyone who "knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the
material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World
Wide Web, makes any communication for commercial purposes that is
available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful
to minors." 202 Persons who violate this provision are subject to a fine
of not more than $50,000 and imprisonment not to exceed six months,
or both. 203 COPA also imposes a further fine of not more than $50,000
for each "intentional" violation of the above provision. 204 For purposes of the proscription on "intentional" violations, each day ofviolation is deemed a separate violation. 205 In addition to criminal
penalties, COPA imposes civil fines of not more than $50,000 for each
violation, Congress again having provided that each day of violation
constitutes a separate violation. 206
1.

The Boundaries of the Proposed Zone

COPA contains several definitions that are intended to clarify its
scope and to alleviate the concerns raised by the Reno Court. The Act
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Reno, 521 U.S. at 881-82, 885.
See infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(l)).
Id.
ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(2)).
ld.
ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(2)-(3)).
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defines a minor as "any person under 17 years of age." 207 Material
that is deemed ''harmful to minors" is defined as follows:
Any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that - (A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the material
as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal
to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest; (B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive
with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or
sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted
sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and (C) taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.2os
Under COPA, a person can be penalized for distributing such material "by means of the World Wide Web," which is in turn defined as
"by placement of material in a computer server-based file archive so
that it is publicly accessible, over the Internet, using hypertext transfer protocol or any successor protocol."209 COPA seeks to punish only
those who make such communications on the Web for "commercial
purposes," which means that only those who are "engaged in the business of making such communications"210 are covered by the Act.
COPA's definition of "engaged in the business" is broad. It means:
that the person who makes a communication, or offers to
make a communication, by means of the World Wide Web,
that includes any material that is harmful to minors devotes
time, attention, or labor to such activities, as a regular course
of such person's trade or business, with the objective of earning a profit as a result of such activities (although it is not
necessary that the person make a profit or that the making or
offering to make such communications be the person's sole or
principal business or source of income). 211
Under COPA, a person is deemed to be "engaged in the business"
of making the proscribed communications if "the person knowingly
causes the material that is harmful to minors to be posted on the
World Wide Web or knowingly solicits such material to be posted on
the World Wide Web." 212 The Act exempts certain persons from liability, including Internet Service Providers and Web browser services. 213
207. ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(7)).
208. ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)) (emphasis added).
209. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(l)).
210. ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(A)).
211. ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B)) (emphasis added).
212. ld.
213. Section 231(b) of the Act provides that a person shall not be considered to make
any communication for commercial purposes to the extent that such person is:
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2. Affirmative Defenses to Conviction
Like the CDA, COPA contains several provisions that purport to
allow a defendant to assert affirmative defenses in prosecutions for
communicating material that is "harmful to minors" on the Web.
These defenses would not, of course, prevent the government from
bringing a prosecution under COPA. They would simply provide defenses that, if proven by a defendant, would allow him or her to escape
conviction.
COPA sets forth three affirmative defenses that are available to a
person who, "in good faith, has restricted access by minors to material
that is harmful to minors." 2 14 First, a defendant may escape conviction "by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code,
or adult personal identification number." 215 Second, persons who "accept[] a digital certificate that verifies age" are allowed an affirmative
defense to conviction. 216 Third, COPA provides an affirmative defense
to anyone who restricts access by minors to ''harmful" material "by
any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available
technology."217
B. THE CoNSTITUTIONALITY oF COPA
The Reno decision caused Congress to improve upon the CDA, but
none of the alterations it made in COPA cure the problems that
doomed Congress' first effort to construct a child-free zone on the Internet. Congress has again failed to appreciate the limitations upon
government regulation posed by the unique architecture of the Internet. More fundamentally, Congress erred in reading the Reno decision as an invitation to draft a second Internet speech law rather than
a signal from the Supreme Court that the medium, and the technology
that is to be applied to it, should be permitted some period of unregu(1) a telecommunications carrier engaged in the provision of a telecommunica-

tions service; (2) a person engaged in the business of providing an Internet
access, service; (3) a person engaged in the business of providing an Internet
information location tool; or (4) similarly engaged in the transmission, storage,
retrieval, hosting, formatting, or translation (or any combination thereoO of a
communication made by another person, without selection or alteration of the
content of the communication, except that such person's deletion of a particular
communication or material made by another person in a manner consistent
with subsection (c) or section 230 shall not constitute such selection or alteration of the content of the communication.
ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(b)). "Internet," "Internet Access Service," and "Internet Information Location Tool" are defined elsewhere in the Act. See id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(3)-(5)).
214. COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)).
215. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(A)).
216. ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(B)).
217. ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(l)(C)).
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lated development. In addition, while COPA addresses some of the
vagueness problems that doomed the CDA, the statute presents its
own troublesome ambiguities.
1.

Responding to Reno

In enacting COPA, Congress sought in several respects to respond
principally to the Reno Court's holdings that the CDA was not narrowly tailored to serve the government's compelling interest in protecting children and was unconstitutionally overbroad. It began with
the geographical scope of the law. Congress limited the breadth of
COPA by applying its prohibition only to materials posted on the Web.
Unlike the CDA, COPA does not appear to apply to content distributed through other aspects of the Internet, such as e-mail and
newsgroups. 218
Responding to the Reno Court's criticism that the CDA applied to
commercial and non-commercial speakers alike, 219 Congress attempted in COPA to regulate only harmful communications that are
made "for commercial purposes." According to the legislative history,
Congress did not believe that COPA would prohibit or have any effect
upon non-commercial activities on the Web. 22 Congress also believed
that the commercial entities it sought to regulate are currently able to
verify the age of users through verified credit cards or other means. 221
Congress also sought to narrow the scope and effect of COPA by
purporting to regulate only a particular category of non-obscene
speech - speech ''harmful to minors" - that is arguably narrower
than the "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech it sought to regulate under the CDA. In formulating this standard, Congress also responded to the Reno Court's concern that the "patently offensive" and

°

218. COPA applies to written communications and, as noted in Part II, e-mail and
chat rooms constitute a portion of the Web's geography. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. Thus, it is not altogether certain that one who publishes material
that is "harmful to minors" via e-mail would not be subject to prosecution under the Act.
Of course, the person would escape conviction if he were not "engaged in the business" of
making communications that include material that is ''harmful to minors."
219. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 877 (stating that the "breadth of the CDA's coverage is
wholly unprecedented. Unlike the regulations upheld in Ginsberg and Pacifica, the
scope of the CDA is not limited to commercial speech or commercial entities. Its openended prohibitions embrace all nonprofit entities and individuals posting indecent
messages or displaying them ... in the presence of minors").
220. See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 7 (1998) ("[COPA) does not prohibit non-commercial activities over the Web, or over the Internet for that matter, and thus the concerns
raised by the Supreme Court are no longer applicable."); Id. at 8 (stating COPA "does
not affect noncommercial speech").
221. See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 8 ("[COPA) provides a legitimate defense for
commercial purveyors of pornography."); Id. at 10 (noting that COPA provides Web publishers with "a host of good faith defenses from prosecution if they adopt reasonable
measures to restrict a minor's access to material that is harmful").
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"indecent" language that was used in the CDA was too vague to place
speakers on notice of what speech was prohibited. 222 Material that is
"harmful to minors" 223 is defined by incorporating the Miller obscenity
test, as modified by the Supreme Court's holdings in Ginsberg v. New
York 224 and other cases, that minors may be denied access to speech
that is constitutionally protected as to adults.
Finally, Congress sought to alleviate the Supreme Court's concern
that the CDA denied parents the right to maintain ultimate control in
rearing their children. 225 Under the CDA, a parent who purchased
"indecent" or "patently offensive" materials for a child would be subject to the Act's penalties. 226 Unlike the CDA, COPA does not prohibit
parents from purchasing material deemed ''harmful to minors" for
their children who are under the age of seventeen.
2.

High Hurdles for Internet Speech Restrictions

While Congress altered COPA in various respects to meet the
Reno Court's criticisms, it did not abandon the fundamental approach
to Internet speech regulation that it adopted in the CDA. Like the
CDA, COPA is a criminal statute, which poses a very strong risk that
speakers will remain silent rather than post words, images, or ideas
on the Web that might fall within COPA's restrictions. 227 Neither the
regulatory landscape nor the medium has changed in any significant
respect since the CDA was invalidated. COPA, like the CDA, and unlike the FCC order upheld in Pacifica, is an attempt to regulate a new
communications medium that has no history of government regulation, has low access barriers, and is not characterized by the invasive
nature of its content.22s
Like its predecessor, COPA is a content-based regulation of constitutionally protected speech. As such, COPA will be treated by the
courts as presumptively invalid. This presumption of invalidity is especially difficult to overcome in COPA's case, as COPA criminalizes
material that is constitutionally protected for adults. Although
COPA's "harmful to minors" standard is arguably narrower than the
categories of "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech regulated by
the CDA, there is no doubt that like the restrictions in the CDA,
COPA limits speech that is constitutionally protected as to adults.
222. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870-74.
223. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
224. 390 u.s. 629 (1968).
225. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865.
226. Id.
227. ld. at 872.
228. Id. at 868 (citing Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 637-38; Sable Communications,
492 U.S. at 128; Red Lion Broad., 395 U.S. at 366).
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COPA's prohibition on material that is "harmful to minors" applies to any "communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter" that meets the ''harmful to
minors" standard. 229 Material is "harmful to minors" if it: (1) "with
respect to minors, is designed to appeal to ... the prurient interest;"
(2) is "patently offensive with respect to minors;" and (3) "lack[s] serious ... value for minors."230 Thus, the definition of ''harmful to minors" expressly requires that the speaker take into account the impact
of the speech on minors, not on adults. There is a large category of
speech, for example, that is not "patently offensive" for adults to communicate and receive, and that has value when communicated to
adults, but that many communities may believe is offensive and lacks
value for communication to minors. Further, Congress substantially
expanded the category of proscribed speech by failing to distinguish
between material that lacks value for a sixteen-year-old and material
that lacks value for a younger child. Under COPA, speakers are at
risk if they communicate material that could be deemed harmful to an
eight-year-old user.
Given these similarities to the CDA, there is no reason to believe
that courts will treat COPA any differently by implementing a standard of review less onerous than strict scrutiny. 231 Thus, COPA will
stand only if it is justified by a compelling governmental interest and
is "narrowly tailored" to effectuate that interest. 2 3 2

3.

The (Over) Breadth of the COPA Zone

It will not be difficult for the government to satisfy the "compelling interest" prong of strict scrutiny review. The Supreme Court accepted in Reno, as it had on many prior occasions, that the
government's interest in protecting at least younger children from
harmful materials they may encounter on the Internet is a compelling
229. See COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)).
230. See id.
231. The district court that granted a temporary restraining order against enforcement of COPA assumed that strict scrutiny should be applied to COPA. See ACLU v.
Reno, No. 98-5591 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 1998) (on file with author). See also Reno, 521 U.S.
at 868, 870 (concluding that case law provided "no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium"). The government may
argue that COPA, which on its face seeks to prohibit only speech made "for commercial
purposes," is a regulation of so-called "commercial speech," and therefore should be subjected to lesser First Amendment scrutiny. Even assuming that the government could
demonstrate that COPA narrowly targets so-called "commercial speech," under the
Supreme Court's precedents the level of scrutiny does not depend so much upon the
nature of the speech as upon the nature of the medium of expression. See id. at 868,
870. Because COPA is a content-based restriction of speech on the Internet, it should be
subjected to the most exacting judicial scrutiny.
232. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
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one. 233 Thus, as with the CDA, parties litigating the constitutionality
of COPA will join issue at the point where the courts must determine
whether the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve Congress' compelling objective. 234
Congress' effort to build an "adults only" zone on the Web that
resembles a real-space zone encounters two related, fundamental
flaws in cyberspace. The first problem is that regardless of Congress'
intent, COPA's definition of Web speech made "for commercial purposes" will have a substantial effect on speech communicated over the
Web for free. The second problem, which is related to the first, is that
while all of the changes to the statutory language noted above represent modest improvements over the CDA, none successfully addresses
the fundamental difficulties that the absence of geography and identity on the Internet pose for the regulation of cyber-speech. Despite
the Reno Court's strong message that the technology does not yet exist
to support the type of affirmative defenses Congress would subsequently incorporate into COPA, Congress nonetheless proceeded on
the assumption that these affirmative defenses would be widely available to protect the targeted "commercial" speakers from conviction. 235
As I will demonstrate, however, Congress' mis-interpretations of
COPA's breadth and effect were errors of constitutional dimension.
COPA's ultimate effect will be to silence a substantial number of
speakers, who will be unable to find cover in the statute's affirmative
defenses and therefore will be forced to resort to self-censorship.
a.

The Intractable Overbreadth Problem

As the district court observed in Reno, the content of speech on
the Web, which is provided by millions of users worldwide, "is as diverse as human thought." 236 It ranges from art, to humor, to literature, to medical information, to music, to news, to sexually oriented
material. For example, on the Web one can view the full text of the
Bible, read the New York Times, or browse through paintings from art
galleries around the world.
Congress's apparent intent was to apply COPA's speech restrictions narrowly to only those online vendors who sell pornographic
233. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 875; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) ("It
is evident beyond the need for elaboration that the State's interest in safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of a 'minor' is 'compelling.'") (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
234. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (noting that government may effectuate even a compelling interest only "by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests
without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms").
235. Reno, 521 U.S. at 881-82.
236. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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materials "for commercial purposes." If that was the intent, however,
Congress failed to effectuate it in the text of the statute itself. Instead, Congress drafted the statute in such a way as to cover all persons who make "any communication for commercial purposes that is
available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful
to minors."2 3 7 Under the plain language of COPA, a speaker is subjected to civil and criminal penalties if, as a regular course of business,
he communicates any material for commercial purposes on the Web
that includes any material - even a single description or photograph
-that is harmful to minors. In addition, Congress forbade in COPA
the transmission of purely ''written" materials that are "harmful to
minors." 2 38 If its intent was to target commercial pornographers,
Congress failed to draft a statute to effectuate this intent.
In any event, Congress wrote the commercial/non-commercial dichotomy into COPA as a direct response to the Supreme Court's statement in Reno that the CDA was overbroad because it applied to "noncommercial" as well as "commercial" speakers. 239 The Court found
this distinction relevant, in part, because financial costs and burdens
are a relevant consideration in determining whether a speech-restnctive law uses the least restrictive means to prohibit the targeted
speech. 240 As the Reno Court noted, the substantial number of publishers who provide their content on the Internet for free would be
financially incapable of implementing the technology required under
the CDA's affirmative defenses, and thus would be subject to criminal
conviction. 241
Some purveyors of sexually explicit material charge their users
for access to their sites by requiring that users "present" a credit card
before entering. These are apparently the "commercial" speakers Congress sought to target when it drafted COPA, and to whom COPA provides an affirmative defense to conviction. 242 · However, what
237. COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(l)) (emphasis added).
238. See id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)).
239. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 865.
240. Id. at 874-79. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975)
(finding unconstitutional deterrent effect on free speech where; to avoid prosecution,
theater owners were required either to "restrict their movie offerings or [to] construct
adequate protective fencing which may be extremely expensive or even physically impracticable"); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 115, 116 (1991) ("A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First
Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their
speech" because such a regulation "raises the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.").
241. Reno, 521 U.S. at 876-77, 881-82.
242. See COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)) (declaring that those who sell
their content on the Web are provided with an affirmative defense when the buyer pays
by credit or debit card). The government will likely urge the courts to construe COPA so
as to apply only to the commercial sale of"pornography." However, the "engaged in the
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Congress (and perhaps the Court243 ) did not understand is that the
overwhelming majority of information on the Web is provided for free
to users by entities who may happen to be communicating on the Web
"for commercial purposes," as that phrase has been defined by
Congress. 244
Like many traditional, real space print newspapers, bookstores,
and magazine publishers, many Web publishers make a profit, or attempt to make a profit, through advertising. In addition, cyberspace
content providers such as online booksellers, music stores, and art
vendors allow potential customers to browse their content for freesimilar to browsing in a real space book store or art gallery. Finally,
some Web publishers make a profit by charging their content contributors, although users may access the content on their sites for free.
Thus, there is a vast amount of information on the Web that is
provided to users for free by entities who operate "with the objective of
earning a profit."245 Much of this information, particularly that which
concerns matters of sexuality, might be deemed ''harmful to minors" in
some communities. For example, a Web user can access the entire
Starr Report concerning President Clinton's sexual relationship with
an intern and any related discussions, explicit safer-sex information,
pictures by well-known artists such as Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano, and videos about AIDS. So long as the provider of such
content sought in some manner to make a profit from its Web site,
COPA would prohibit distribution of this information to adults and

business" language chosen by Congress, which covers anyone who seeks to make a profit
(whether successful or not) and devotes "time and attention" to making communications
that include content that is "harmful to minors," is not "readily susceptible" to such a rewrite and therefore would not warrant such a limited construction. See Reno, 521 U.S.
at 884 (stating that a court "may impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is
'readily susceptible' to such a construction") (quoting Virginia v. American Booksellers
Ass'n, Inc. 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)). It is "for Congress, not [the courts), to rewrite the
statute." Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 (1971).
243. The Court in Reno was not confronted with a statute that made any effort to
distinguish between those who provided content for free and those who sought to make
a profit from their content. The Court did, however, note that the expense of complying
with the CDA would have been prohibitive even for some "commercial" content providers. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 876-77.
244. COPA does not require that a content provider devote the majority of its time
or Web site space to speech that is "harmful to minors." A provider is "engaged in the
business" of making harmful speech so long as he or she "devotes time, attention, or
labor" to making such speech "as a regular course of such person's trade or business."
COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B)). Nor is it necessary that the information provider be profitable in such endeavors. See id. (declaring that for liability to attach, it is "not necessary that the person make a profit").
245. COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B)).
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children alike, unless the publisher is able to take advantage of one of
COPA's affirmative defenses to conviction. 246
A description of a few of the seventeen plaintiffs in the current
lawsuit seeking to block COPA from taking effect demonstrates that
Congress' commercial/non-commercial dichotomy is unworkable in
cyberspace and encompasses within COPA's prohibitions a wide range
of speech that does not constitute pornography sold for profit by online
smut vendors. 247 Androgyny Books, d/b/a A Different Light Bookstores, one of the plaintiffs in the pending lawsuit, maintains a Web
site through which visitors can purchase books and music of interest
to gay and lesbian individuals and can receive information about the
gay and lesbian community, some of which may be deemed ''harmful
to minors" under COPA. Visitors to this Web site may browse the
"bookshelves" located on the site for books about gay and lesbian issues or by gay and lesbian authors. In addition, the Web site offers
book reviews and publishes essays and book excerpts which may contain material that is "harmful to minors." Users may currently visit
the Androgyny site anonymously and need present a credit card only if
they wish to make a purchase.
ArtNet Worldwide Corporation, another plaintiff challenging
COPA, is the leading vendor of fine art on the Web. The ArtNet site
allows users to view, free of charge, samples of art available at auctions, fairs, and museum shows. The site also contains postings of individual artists, who describe their art and exhibit individual works
for sale. Some of the items displayed on the ArtNet site for free may
be considered ''harmful to minors." In addition, the ArtNet site contains a magazine providing news articles, editorials, and art criticism
written by its own correspondents and gathered from external
sources, as well as chat rooms where users can promote their own art
and discuss art in general. ArtNet funds its site by selling space on it
to advertisers and to sellers of art and related items, such as artists
and galleries.
Addazi, Inc., d/b/a Condomania, maintains a Web site that focuses
on assisting customers in learning about and purchasing condoms and
safer sex products. The site contains an online catalog featuring over
250 items, the latest safer sex information, regularly updated newsletters and editorials, and company information. It also includes a seventeen-page Condomania Safer Sex Manual, which uses frank
language to educate and help people understand safer sex issues.
246. Recall that COPA targets both written and visual expression. See COPA (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)).
247. The following descriptions are derived from the Complaint, Reno v. ACLU, No.
98-5591 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1998) (on file with author).

1184

CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

Much of the information provided on the Condomania site may be
deemed ''harmful to minors." As on the Androgyny and ArtNet sites,
users access the Condomania site anonymously and are asked to present a credit card only at the point where they reach the "checkout"
portion of the site to make purchases.
Under COPA, all of the information on these and a host of similar
sites, regardless of its educational or other value, 248 would be unavailable to users. As I explain in the next section, most of these vendors,
like the vendors with whom the Supreme Court was concerned in
Reno, cannot comply with the requirements of COPA's affirmative defenses and must therefore shut down or face criminal prosecutions
and heavy fines. Thus, COPA has the effect of censoring the array of
free content on these sites as a consequence of their "seeking to make
a profit" from advertising or other sources.
In choosing to codify the commerciaVnon-commercial dichotomy
in COPA, Congress has demonstrated the difficulty with transporting
principles that work well in real space into the realm of cyberspace.
Few, if any, purveyors of pornography in real space distribute materials free of charge. Indeed, in most cases real space purveyors of pornographic materials exist for only one purpose - to sell pornography for
profit. As they do not give their products away, we can assume that a
law aimed at the "sale" of pornography will affect these businesses,
and only these businesses. The legislature can require, for example,
that these businesses place sexually explicit ("harmful") images they
wish to sell to the public behind the counter.
In cyberspace, however, many Web sites do not exist solely to sell
the "harmful" materials proscribed by COPA. Their Web sites exist
for other purposes, such as to educate the public on matters of birth
control, sexuality, or other topics unsuitable for consumption by children. Indeed, they may not sell their content at all, relying instead
upon advertising revenues to support the distribution of free content.
Nor can publishers of these Web sites place ''harmful" items (assuming they can be identified with some precision) "behind the counter"
without depriving adults - and perhaps older children - of constitutionally protected speech.
There is a significant difference between the impact of speech restrictive laws that are aimed at "commercial" speakers in real space
and the effect similar laws will have on cyber-speakers who "seek to
make a profit." The architecture of real space allows vendors to discriminate in the distribution of "harmful" material at the point of
248. The "value to minors" prong ofCOPA's "harmful to minors" definition does not
exclude material that has "educational" or "medical" value for minors. See COPA (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)).
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purchase.249 Stated somewhat differently: "porn in real space regulates itself."250 Adults and children alike can generally browse the.
aisles of a real space bookstore, with adults, but not children, being
permitted to purchase certain materials. 251 Porn in cyberspace does
not self-regulate. Because cyberspace, as it now exists, allows everyone to travel and browse anonymously, one can browse the wares of a
site without anyone even knowing you were in the store. The only
fool-proof way to ensure that minors are not browsing is to deny access
to adults as well.
The statute upheld in Ginsberg v. New York, 252 for example, prohibited the direct commercial sale of ''harmful" magazines to minors,
but did not ban any communications between adults. 253 Indeed, the
Ginsberg Court noted that the statute was valid because it "does not
bar the appellant from stocking the magazines and selling them" to
adults. 254 The New York Legislature was reasonably confident that
proprietors could distinguish between children and adults at the point
of sale of "harmful" materials. COPA, by contrast, would prohibit the
communication of information and ideas before any sale was even contemplated. It would require that proprietors of all establishments,
whether or not of an "adult" variety, prohibit anyone from so much as
entering their establishments without first presenting identification
proving that they were seventeen years of age or older. COPA would,
in effect, prohibit the practice of browsing free content, which is one of
the unique characteristics of Web surfing.
In sum, Web speech, at least as it is currently communicated,
does not permit Congress to regulate "commercial" speech without
also substantially suppressing materials that are distributed without
charge. Like the CDA, COPA fails to distinguish between commercial
entities that actually sell information or products over the Internet
and businesses that disseminate free information about their services
or products. The Internet has allowed many small businesses to prosper precisely because they can provide information about their serv249. Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869,
886 (1996).
250. Lessig, 45 EMORY L.J. at 886. It does so, as Professor Lessig points out,
"through social structures and social norms, some actively construed, others evolutionary, that channel porn in real space to a particular place in real space, and discriminate
with some effectiveness in its distribution in that real space." Id. at 885-86.
251. Again, given the architectural attributes of real space, it may be possible to
shield children from browsing certain materials while allowing adults to freely do so,
such as by creating a separate room for adult-oriented materials. The architecture of
cyberspace does not allow such discrimination; once a user accesses a Web site, he or
she cannot be prohibited from any portion of the site.
252. 390 u.s. 629 (1968).
253. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631, 634-35 (1968).
254. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634-35.
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ices at little or no cost to users. COPA would destroy these low entry
barriers, thus silencing many speakers and reducing the breadth of
diversity and information on the Internet, by forcing speakers like the
New York Times, NetArt, and others to charge for all of their speech.
COPA does nothing to assuage the concern articulated by the
Supreme Court in Reno that Congress is threatening to punish a substantial number of publishers who distribute information on the Web
for free. 255
b.

State-of-the-Art Meets State of the Law

As it did with the CDA, the government will again attempt to
limit the potential breadth and effect of its new speech-restrictive legislation by resorting to the Act's affirmative defenses. Reno demonstrated, however, that the government's power to regulate Internet
speech is contingent upon the widespread availability of technology
capable of effecting the architectural changes necessary for constitutionally precise discrimination in the access to and distribution of
"harmful" materials on the Web. 256 As Professor Lessig has stated:
If it is extremely cheap perfectly to discriminate in who hears
what, then there will be no constitutional problem with a regulation that requires perfect discrimination. The Constitution kicks in only when the technologies are not so perfect:
When to comply with a legitimate objective (to protect children), one must sacrifice interests not within the objective (to
make smut available to adults). In those cases, Congress's
power to protect children is limited by the First Amendment
rights of the adults.257
The technology, as it currently exists, does not facilitate the regulation
that COPA mandates. Congress, in other words, has once again failed
to respect the current technological limitations on zoning speech on
the Web. When combined with the unworkable commercial/non-commercial dichotomy in COPA, this technological gap lays bare Congress's inability to grapple with the Internet's pornography problem
without suppressing a substantial amount of constitutionally protected communication.
COPA applies to all communications on the Web that are "available to any minor." 25 8 As the Reno Court noted, "existing technology
[does] not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors
from obtaining access to its communications on the Internet without
255.
256.
257.
258.

Reno, 521 U.S. at 876-79.
ld. at 881-82.
Lessig, 45 EMORY L.J. at 885.
COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(l)).

1999]

THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT

1187

also denying access to adults." 259 Currently available technology,
which was discussed in Part II, 260 provides no reasonable means for
speakers to make their speech "available" only to adults. Engineers
continue to develop "tagging," rating, and DNS technology, but the
prerequisites for establishing effective adults-only zones based on this
technology do not yet exist. There is still no widespread agreement on
how to "rate" or "tag" Web content, and relatively few Web publishers
are employing these largely experimental methods. In addition, the
user-based software necessary to ensure that children are denied access to the tagged or rated content has not yet been developed. From
the perspective of Web speakers, the information that they make
available on the public spaces of the Web must be made available
either to all users of the Web, including users.who may be minors, or
not at all.
One of COPA's defenses applies if a defendant restricts access by
"requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code,• or
adult personal identification number." 261 As noted in Part II, a defense based upon credit card verification is unavailable to the millions
of Web speakers who publish through commercial online services such
as America Online and Prodigy Internet, because there is no technology that would enable credit card verification by those speakers. 262
Further, the credit card defense is effectively unavailable to providers
of free content because, again as noted in Part II, financial institutions
charge to verify a credit card. 263 The cost of credit card verification
will impose devastating economic burdens on speakers and other content providers who want to provide their speech for free. 264 If speakers absorbed the costs of credit card verification themselves, rather
than passing them along to users, some speakers with controversial
content would risk economic sabotage - users who disapproved of
their speech could simply access their site again and again in order to
drive up the cost of verification. The courts have routinely struck
down such economic burdens on the exercise of protected speech. 265
259. Reno, 521 U.S. at 876.
260. See supra notes 28-106 and accompanying text.
261. COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)).
262. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
263. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 856-57 ("Credit .card verification is only feasible, however, ... in connection with a commercial transaction in which the card is used ....").
264. The economic burdens would include the costs of special software applications
and secure servers, as well as the costs of verification. Affidavits submitted by plaintiffs
in the lawsuit challenging COPA estimate that the cost for credit card verification could
be as high as $200,000 per month for a site that receives approximately 100,000 users
per month.
265. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 217 (invalidating a city requirement that outdoor
theater owners "construct adequate protective fencing which may be extremely expensive or even physically impracticable"); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115-16 ("A stat-
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Validation by debit card 266 would also require a financial transaction, and thus, is unavailable to content providers who provide their
speech for free. Similarly, requiring speakers to set up an adult identification system267 or a system to accept "digital certificates"268
before they can provide free content is technologically and economically infeasible for the vast majority of content providers covered by
COPA. As the district court pointed out in Reno, the cost of creating
and maintaining an age verification system "would be prohibitive even
for a commercial entity such as HotWired, the online version of Wired
magazine." 2 6 9 What is more, age verification requirements would
likely have an adverse effect on revenue for "commercial" content
providers, as advertisers depend upon a demonstration that the sites
are widely available and frequently visited. 2 70
Digital certificate technology, another defense held out by COPA,
is not currently in widespread use, and may not become universally
adopted for a considerable time, if ever. COPA also provides a "catchall" type of affirmative defense for Web publishers who take "other
reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology'' 271
to restrict access to materials by minors. As noted in Part II, however,
there are currently no other "reasonable measures" that allow content
providers to limit their speech to adults. 272 The "catchall" defense in
fact catches nothing. Both the digital certificate and "other reasonable
measures" defenses, therefore, depend entirely upon the prospects of
future technology. Just as the Reno Court rejected the argument that
future technological advances could be used to narrow the CDA, so too
will courts find the government's rosy predictions of prospective techute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial
burden on speakers because of the content of their speech" because such regulation
"raises the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.").
266. See COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(A)).
267. See id.
268. See id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(l)(B)).
269. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 847.
270. As the Pennsylvania district court recently concluded in granting a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of COPA:
Evidence presented to this Court is likely to establish at trial that the implementation of credit card or adult verification screens in front of material that is
harmful to minors may deter users from accessing such materials and that the
loss of users of such material may affect the speakers' economic ability to provide such communications .... The plaintiffs are likely to establish at trial that
under COPA, Web site operators and content providers may feel an economic
disincentive to engage in communications that are or may be considered to be
harmful to minors and thus, may self-censor the content of their sites.
Memorandum and order of Reed, J., ACLU v. Reno, No. 98-5591 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (on file
with author).
271. COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(l)(C)).
272. See supra ntoes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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nological advances insufficient to justify Congress's latest attempt to
enact a statute criminalizing speech. Future technology cannot save a
statute that criminalizes a wide array of speech today.
On a more fundamental level, affirmative defenses do little to
limit the inevitable chilling effect that the threat of criminal prosecution will inevitably have on free speech. Once a criminal prosecution
begins, it is small consolation to a defendant that he or she may prove
innocence by falling into one of the "safe harbors" provided by COPA.
Moreover, COPA's defenses are no more available for the vast majority of Web speakers than those found wanting in Reno. In fact, none of
COPA's affirmative defenses are available to the Web speakers who
are likely to be most affected by the statute - those who provide content for free, but who seek to make a profit from their sites. These
speakers are left with no way to comply with COPA. Thus, they are
left with two equally untenable alternatives: (1) risk prosecution and
heavy civil penalties under COPA, or (2) attempt to engage in selfcensorship and thereby deny adults and older minors access to constitutionally protected speech.
Congress assumed, incorrectly, that COPA's affirmative defenses
would be widely available to most Web content providers. That assumption was, in turn, based upon an underlying assumption that
COPA would not affect persons who provide free content on the Web:
Those who sell pornographic content for a living, Congress apparently
reasoned, can afford to limit their audience by credit card or some
other form of age verification. As I have explained, however, Congress' underlying assumption was also a fatal miscalculation. By
sweeping within the definition of "commercial" speech a substantial
number of speakers who seek to make a profit, but nevertheless provide content on the Web for free, Congress effectively eviscerated the
affirmative defenses provided by COPA for millions of Web speakers,
Oddly, it appears that Congress recognized that it was regulating
in disregard of technological advances. At the same time it enacted
COPA, Congress created a temporary "Commission on Online Child
Protection"273 for the purpose of "conducting a study ... regarding
methods to help reduce access by minors to material that is harmful to
minors on the Internet."2 7 4 Congress charged the Commission with
identifying and analyzing the various technological tools and methods
for protecting minors from harmful material, many of which were dis273. The Commission is to be composed of nineteen members chosen from a crosssection of the Internet business community, including Internet access services, representatives of businesses that provide Internet filtering or blocking services, content
providers, and persons engaged in the business of providing ratings, labeling, and domain name services. See H.R. REP. No. 105-11242 § 1406(c) (1998) (uncodified).
274. H.R. REP. No. 105-11242 § 1406(c).
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cussed in Part II of this article, including filtering or blocking
software, age verification systems, rating systems, the establishment
of a domain name for posting any material that is harmful to minors,
and any other existing or proposed technologies. 275
Thus, Congress created a commission to study after the enactment of a restrictive criminal statute what it undoubtedly should have
studied beforehand: the technology available to restrict minors' access
to "harmful" materials on the Internet, and the costs associated with
that technology. Armed only with whatever technological background
knowledge it had when the CDA was passed, Congress mistakenly
proceeded in literal fashion to tinker with the language of COPA to
address some of the Reno Court's concerns. Legislators failed, however, to heed the Court's broader warning that they must proceed with
the utmost caution and become fully informed of the state of cyberspace technology before regulating the content of speech on this vast
new communicative medium, particularly if the government regulation is to take the form of a criminal statute. Contrary to the Supreme
Court's clear directive, Congress' Internet speech restriction has once
again outpaced the state-of-the-art.
The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable
for a sandbox."276 Because COPA, like the CDA, would result in limiting communications on the Web to those suitable only for children, it
is not a narrowly tailored method for protecting children from "harmful" materials. 277 Thus, the fatal constitutional flaw for COPA, as it
was for the CDA, is that "in order to deny minors access to potentially
harmful speech," the law "effectively suppresses a large amount of
275. In analyzing these technologies, the Commission is required specifically to examine the costs associated with the various methods of restricting minors' access to
harmful materials, the effects of those technologies on users' privacy, and the extent to
which harmful material is globally distributed and the effects of existing and proposed
technology on such distribution. See H.R. REP. No. 105-11242 § 1406(c). The Commission is required to submit a report to Congress containing the results of its study within
one year of COPA's enactment.
276. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983). See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 381, 383-84 (1957) (striking down a ban on material "manifestly
tending to the corruption of the morals of youth").
277. In addition to limiting adults' access to constitutionally protected speech,
COPA also restricts access by older minors to speech that is constitutionally protected
as to them. COPA draws no distinction between minors who are six or eight years old
and those who are sixteen or seventeen years old. Information concerning topics such
as gay and lesbian issues, safe sex, and women's health may be deemed "harmful" to
younger minors, but would be quite valuable to older minors. The First Amendment
protects the rights of minors to receive information and ideas necessary to their development and participation as citizens. See Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 693, 700-02 (1977).
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speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another."278

4.

Efficacy And Less Restrictive Alternatives

Apart from its overbroad scope, COPA is an ineffective means of
achieving the government's asserted interest in protecting children
from "harmful" materials. Strict scrutiny requires that a law be invalidated "if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose."279 Under this analysis, the government must
demonstrate that a statute will in fact alleviate the alleged harms in a
"direct and material" way.zso
It appears that Congress, in enacting COPA, sought primarily to
prohibit the distribution of "pornographic" images over the Web by
commercial pornographers. Even if it can be assumed that Congress's
intent may be so narrowly construed, the statute would have little effect even on this limited category of ''harmful" materials. Existing
laws already punish the distribution and importation over the Internet of the most ''harmful" material - "obscenity'' and "child pornography."281 The vast majority of the remaining category of
''harmful" material is not provided on the Internet for free, but rather
is provided only after a fee is paid. Thus, ironically, purveyors of this
material are already purportedly protected under COPA's credit card
affirmative defense. COPA also allows the distribution of pornography so long as it is communicated by "noncommercial" entities. Thus,
the only ''harmful" material really affected by COPA's prohibitions is
that which is provided for free and conveys frank, useful information
concerning matters of sexuality. Finally, even as to the so-called
"commercial" sites, many minors have access to credit cards, and there
is no evidence that an artful minor could not pose as an adult in order
to gain access to "harmful" material.
In addition, Congress also left unresolved another significant
problem with the CDA- the regulation of "harmful" materials posted
abroad. The nature of the Web makes it highly unlikely that COPA
will be effective at ridding it of "harmful" material. The Web, like the
278. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
279. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
280. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994). As Justice Scalia
wrote in his concurrence in Florida Star v. B.J.F., "a law cannot be regarded as ...
justifying a restriction upon truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to [the
government's] supposedly vital interest unprohibited." Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524, 541-42 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
281. See 18 U.S.C. § 522 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (addressing the importation of
obscenity); Id. § 1460 (addressing obscenity); Id. § 2251 (dealing ·with child
pornography).
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Internet as a whole, is global in nature. Thus, material posted on the
Web by an overseas speaker will be just as available to minors as material that is posted in the United States. · COPA, like the CDA, will
not prevent minors from gaining access to the large percentage of material that originates abroad. 282
In reality, therefore, COPA will prevent minors from accessing
only a very small category of "harmful" materials (while at the same
time having the unconstitutional effect of preventing adults and older
minors from receiving and communicating constitutionally protected
materials). Minors would be prohibited from accessing only material
that: (1) is not already illegal under existing obscenity and child pornography laws; (2) does not require payment; (3) is not communicated
by amateurs with no profit motive; and (4) is not provided by overseas
content providers. 283 As the government cannot meet its burden of
establishing that COPA alleviates the alleged "harms in a direct and
material way," 284 COPA leaves "appreciable damage to [the] supposedly vital interest unprohibited."285
To survive strict scrutiny, COPA must not only be an effective
means, but also the least restrictive means, of achieving Congress' objective.286 However, as discussed in detail in Part II, there are a host
of alternative means available that restrict minors' access to ''harmful" material without preventing adults from accessing such material.
America Online and Prodigy, for example, offer features that prevent
children from accessing chat rooms and block access to Web sites and
discussion groups based upon key words, subject matter, or content.
In addition, a growing number of Internet Service Providers offer prefiltered access for users. In addition to blocking pornography, these
282. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 878 n.45.
283. The Justice Department opined that diverting law enforcement resources from
ongoing criminal obscenity investigations to COPA prosecutions would be particularly
ill-advised given the uncertainty concerning COPA's efficacy. The Department stated in
its letter to Congress:
There are thousands of newsgroups and Internet relay chat channels on which
anyone can access pornography; and children would still be able to obtain ready
access to pornography from a myriad of overseas web sites. The COPA apparently would not attempt to address those sources oflnternet pornography ....
The practical or legal difficulty in addressing these considerable alternative
sources from which children can obtain pornography raises questions about the
efficacy of the COPA and the availability of expending scarce resources on its
enforcement.
See 144 Cong. Rec. S12796 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (letter from L. Anthony Sutin, Acting Assistant Attorney General).
284. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 664.
285. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541-42.
286. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 ("It is not enough to show that the Government's
ends are compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.").
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filters screen for violent content, drug-related information and certain
forms of hate speech.
There are also numerous user-based software applications that
allow users to block access to certain Web sites. These programs· are
not a perfect solution; some applications screen too broadly, blocking
valuable Web sites, while others fail to screen all inappropriate material. But user-based software applications are a far less restrictive alternative than COPA's criminal censorship of protected speech. 287
Indeed, Congress recognized the usefulness of these alternatives when
it enacted COPA and required that Internet Service Providers "notify
[all new customers] that parental control protections (such as computer hardware, software or filtering services) are commercially available that may assist the customer in limiting access to material that is
harmful to minors."288
In addition to preserving parental control over minors' access to
Web content, user-based programs are a far more effective means of
achieving Congress' objective of restricting minors' access to "harmful"
materials. User-based applications allow parents to shield minors
from sexually oriented materials that originate abroad or from amateur or non-commercial sites, as well as from sites that require a
credit card for payment. Had Congress allowed its Commission to
study these alternatives prior to passing a content-based criminal
statute, the Commission would likely have advised that a user-based

287. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 877; Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 758 (declaring that informational requirements and user-based blocking are more narrowly tailored than
speaker-based schemes as a means of limiting minors' access to indecent materials).
See also Fabulous Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780, 787
(3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that pre-blocking of dial-a-porn calls was less restrictive
means of protecting children than requirement that adults apply for access codes to
receive such messages). In Fabulous Associates, the Third Circuit rejected the Commonwealth's argument that access codes were more effective than pre-blocking, since
children could request unblocking and thereby gain access to sexually explicit messages.
The court concluded that "(i]n this respect, the decision a parent must make is comparable to whether to keep sexually explicit books on the shelf or subscribe to adult
magazines. No constitutional principle is implicated. The responsibility for making
such choices is where our society has traditionally placed it - on the shoulders of the
parent." Fabulous Assocs., 896 F.2d at 787.
288. COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)). Of course, Congress is free to further its interests by educating the public about the benefits and dangers of the Internet
and, more particularly, the Web. As the Supreme Court noted in Denver Area, "informational requirements" and user-based blocking are more narrowly tailored than
speaker-based schemes as a means of limiting minors' access to offensive or harmful
material. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 757-58. Congress recognized the value of such educational efforts when it enacted the CDA. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, § 552(1), 110 Stat. 142 (encouraging establishment of "technology fund" to
support development of user-based blocking technology and public education).
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solution is a preferable means of screening minors' access to inappropriate content on the Web.289

5.

Vagueness Problems

While not likely to be a separate ground for invalidating the statute, courts will likely frown upon COPA for the additional reason that
its terms create uncertainty for speakers faced with the prospect of a
criminal prosecution. 290 Like the CDA, COPA is vague in several significant respects.
First, COPA fails to define the relevant community that will set
the standard for what is ''harmful to minors" on the global Web. The
community might be the local community that is viewing the speech or
the community of adults communicating on the Web. If the standard
is the former, how can a speaker who operates a Web site in New York
predict what prosecutors in Alabama or Kansas might deem ''harmful
to minors?" 291 Absent some guidance as to the relevant community,
speakers will "steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." 292
Second, COPA fails to define the relevant age of the minor for purposes of determining whether material is ''harmful to minors." It is
not clear whether COPA prohibits material that lacks value for all
minors, for some minors, or for some variation of the "average" or "reasonable" sixteen-year-old. It is unclear whether minors of a certain
289. The Pennsylvania district court concluded in its Memorandum enjoining enforcement of COPA that besides the fact that effective blocking software exists, there
are other respects in which COPA is not the least restrictive means for achieving Congress's apparent objective of shielding children from on-line pornography. The court
noted that the "sweeping category" of forms of content prohibited under COPA - including "any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind" - "could have been less restrictive of speech on the
Web and more narrowly tailored to Congress's goal of shielding minors from pornographic teasers if the prohibited forms of content had included, for instance, only pictures, images, or graphic image files, which are typcially employed by adult
entertainment Web sites as 'teasers.'" Memorandum and Order of Reed, J., at 29 Reno
(No. 98-5591) (on file with author). The district court also opined that Congress could
have proceeded without imposition of "possibly excessive and serious criminal penalties" for communicating speech that is protected as to adults. See id.
290. The Reno Court pointed out that the vagueness of the CDA was "a matter of
special concern for tow reasons." Reno, 521 U.S. at 871. First, the statute was a content-based restriction on speech, which has an "obvious chilling effect on free speech."
ld. at 872. Second, the CDA was a criminal statute. In addition to the "opprobrium and
stigma of a criminal conviction," the CDA imposed severe fines on the prohibited communications. ld.; see Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (stating that
"[n)o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes") (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)).
291. One of the judges on the district court panel in Reno would have held that the
CDA was unconstitutionally vague because it did not define the relevant community for
determining "indecency." See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 863.
292. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
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age can discern any ''value," whether social, political, or literary, in
certain materials. A speaker who attempts to satisfy COPA's "harmful to minors" standard may be assigned the hopelessly difficult task
of determining whether its content contains "value" for an eight-yearold. Again, this uncertainty, coupled with the threat of criminal prosecution and substantial fines, will substantially restrict the speech
that is made available on the Web.
Third, the definition of "harmful to minors" actually used in
COPA is vague in at least one respect. The phrase "considered as a
whole," which is part of the "serious value" prong of the Miller test, is
nearly impossible to apply to online communications. As discussed in
Part II, Web sites are comprised of thousands of linked documents,
images, and texts, simultaneously presented through an ad-hoc linking process. COPA offers no guidance as to how a speaker is to treat
or the government to define the "work as a whole" for purposes of the
"harmful to minors" test.
Finally, COPA provides for enhanced penalties for "intentional"
versus "knowing" violations, yet fails to define the distinction between
the two types of violations. 293 Nor is there any indication from Congress as to why the two distinct penalty provisions are necessary or
desirable. It might be that an "intentional" violation entails active
promotion of"harmful" materials to an audience of minors. In the absence of any clear definition, however, speakers cannot know how to
avoid prosecution for "intentional" violations.
All of these additional concerns will cause courts to view COPA
with skepticism. As the Reno Court determined, a content-based
criminal speech restriction ought to present very clear guidelines for
speakers who are faced with heavy penalties for non-compliance.
COPA, like the CDA, fails to meet this requirement.

6.

COPA's Effect On Users and the Medium

Even if technology allowed speakers to effectively use credit cards,
debit cards or other methods to verify the age of users, such requirements would fundamentally alter the nature and values of the Web,
which is characterized by spontaneous, instantaneous, albeit often unpredictable, communication by hundreds of thousands of individual
speakers around the globe. Without the access barriers imposed by
COPA, the Web provides an affordable and often seamless means of
accessing an enormous and diverse body of information, ideas and
viewpoints. While the Supreme Court has allowed reasonably narrow
regulations of speech communicated over various media, it has never
293. See COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(l)-(2)).
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upheld a speech restriction that fundamentally alters the very nature
of the medium.
COPA would prevent or deter possibly hundreds of thousands of
readers from accessing protected speech, even if it were feasible for
speakers to set up a system to verify age. Readers who do not have
the necessary identification would be denied access. Many adults do
not have a credit card, and many foreign users are even less likely to
have a credit card or other necessary identification. Further, many
users will not want to provide personal information to obtain speech
for free. In striking down the CDA, the Supreme Court noted that
"[t]here is evidence suggesting that adult users, particularly casual
Web browsers, would be discouraged from retrieving information that
required use of a credit card or password."294 Users may not want to
disclose their credit card numbers unless they are actually making a
purchase.
In addition, COPA's registration requirement would prevent
users from accessing information anonymously, and would thus deter
many users from accessing sensitive or controversial speech covered
by COPA. 2 9 5 The Supreme Court recently invalidated a similar "registration" requirement as applied to cable viewers. In Denver Area
Educations Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 296 the Supreme
Court struck down a statutory requirement that viewers provide written notice to cable operators if they want access to certain sexually
oriented programs, because the requirement "restrict[s] viewing by
subscribers who fear for their reputations should the operator, advertently or inadvertently, disclose the list of those who wish to watch
the ... channel." 297 Requiring that Web speakers register their users
by credit card or adult identification on pain of felony conviction and
onerous civil :fines is a more onerous burden than the scheme held unconstitutional in Denver Area.29B
294. Reno, 521 U.S. at 857 n.23.
295. See Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 356-57 (1995) (invalidating Ohio statute prohibiting anonymous distribution of campaign literature); see also
Lam.ont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (invalidating requirement that
recipients of communist literature notify post office that they wish to receive such
materials). Mcintyre establishes a limited protection for anonymous speech. The Court
was explicit that the opinion reached "only written communications and, particularly,
leaflets of the kind Mrs. Mcintyre distributed." Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 338 n.3. The case
does not, therefore, settle the right of the government to regulate anonymity.
296. 518 u.s. 727 (1996).
297. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 754 (1996).
298. See Fabulous Assocs. v. Penn. Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780, 785 (3d Cir.
1990) (holding that the First Amendment "protects against governmental 'inhibition as
well as prohibition.' An identification requirement exerts an inhibitory effect and such
deterrence raises First Amendment issues comparable to those raised by direct state
imposed burdens or restrictions.") (quoting Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 60, 6465 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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Congress's objective of protecting children from materials deemed
"harmful" to their physical and psychological well-being is certainly
compelling. However, the First Amendment states that "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Despite good
intentions, COPA abridges a substantial amount of protected speech
provided on the Internet for free. The statute must therefore be invalidated. Indeed, as the district court recently noted in enjoining enforcement of COPA, "perhaps we do the minors of this country harm if
First Amendment protections, which they will with age inherit fully,
are chipped away in the name of their protection."299
V.

SOLVING THE INTRACTABLE PORNOGRAPHY DILEMMA

Congress, confronted with the Internet's intractable pornography
problem, has three options. First, it might refine COPA in order to
more narrowly prohibit the speech it apparently finds objectionable ~
"teasers," or pornographic images provided for free on Web sites that
sell pornography for profit. Second, Congress could wait for the state
of the art, specifically computer code that establishes geography and
identity, to advance to the point where cyberzoning meets the requirements of real space law. Finally, Congress could choose to do nothing,
relying instead upon market-based solutions, such as user-based
blocking software to zone Internet pornography. I shall discuss these
options in turn. While I fear that Congress, for political reasons, will
focus on the first, I believe that the Internet and its users would be
better served by Congressional restraint.
A.

A MoRE NARROWLY TAILORED ALTERNATIVE TO COPA

Assuming that Congress's primary purpose in enacting COPA
was to shield children from the pornographic "teasers" placed on Web
sites to lure visitors inside, 300 a statute narrowly tailored to serve that
purpose can readily be drafted. Three changes ought to be made to
COPA in order to satisfy the mandates of the First Amendment.
First, Congress should narrow the categories of speech that fall
within the statute. COPA prohibits "[a]ny communication, picture,
299. See Memorandum Granting Preliminary Injunction, ACLU v. Reno, No. 985591 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1999) (on file with author).
300. This, indeed, would appear to have been Congress's intent. COPA does not
apply to Web publishers who make pornographic images available for free to all who
visit the site. Only those who include such materials on their sites "as a regular course
oftrade or business" are subject to COPA's penalties. As the House Committee on Commerce noted in its report, "even though some Web sites contain warnings that the material on that Web site is adult-oriented, most provide no warnings, or if they do provide a
warning, there is sexually explicit material on the same page as the warning." H.R.
REP. No. 105-775, at ?0-21 (1998).
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image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter
of any kind" that is obscene or "harmful to .minors."301 A far less restrictive statute would prohibit only "harmful" pictures, images, or
graphic image files, which are typically employed by commercial
pornographers as "teasers" on their sites. Limiting the regulated
forms of content to pictures and the like would eliminate from the
threat of prosecution a vast array of Internet content providers who
provide frank discussions and written educational materials on such
topics as safer sex and abortion.
Second, Congress should alter the ''value" prong of the Miller test
in various respects. It should exempt from coverage any image or
graphic image file that, standing alone, has serious artistic, educational, medical or scientific value for any minor. Three distinct
changes to COPA are contemplated here. COPA, incorporating a modified Miller test, subjects a publisher to prosecution for making available on a Web site any "communication," etc., that "taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors."302 The first proposed alteration is to require that each image or
graphic image file be judged on its own merits, and not "taken as a
whole." The "taken as a whole" formulation is unworkable in cyberspace, as it is difficult to define what the "whole" consists of on a Web
site that contains numerous links to other sites and is divided into
many files of its own. "Teasers," or whatever other images prosecutors
believe fall within the strictures of the statute, should stand or fall
based upon a viewing conducted in isolation. The second proposed alteration is to add both an "educational" and "medical" component to
the values listed in Miller and COPA. Pictures of condoms, for example, and instructions concerning how to use them, may have no "artisitic" or "scientific" value for minors, but undoubtedly have an
educational or medical value that is potentially life-saving. The third
alteration I propose to the ''value" component of the Miller test is to
exempt any image or picture that has value as to any minor. COPA
does not distinguish between minors who are very young and those on
the cusp of adulthood. Thus, an image that may have some artistic or
other value for a sixteen-year-old is still prohibited, as it may have no
such value at all from the perspective of a very young minor. The proposed alteration would protect the constitutional rights of older minors to view materials that may be deemed ''harmful" to their much
younger counterparts.
Finally, Congress should abandon the criminalization paradigm
of the CDA and COPA. Congress's goals could be served without im301. · See COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)).
302. See id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(C)).
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position of excessive criminal penalties for communication of speech
that is protected as to adults. Violations of zoning laws in real space
result in civil penalties. There is no reason, save politics, to deviate
from this approach in cyberspace.
I believe that the proposed alterations would save COPA from invalidation under the First Amendment. The proposed statute would
serve Congress's goals of protecting children from pornographic
images made available for free on commercial pornography sites,
while protecting the rights of minors, particularly older minors, to receive images that have educational, artistic, or scientific value.
B.

FROM BORDERS TO BOUNDARIES

Of course, the fact that Congress could enact a speech-restrictive
statute that passes First Amendment scrutiny does not mean that it
ought to do so. At least, it does not mean that Congress ought to do so
now. Zoning is anathema to cyberspace. The near anarchy of the Internet provides no means for putting people or speech in their proper
place. Indeed, they have no "proper place" there. The architecture of
cyberspace allows everyone to move freely and to consume information
without boundaries or walls.
In the absence of natural boundaries, however, Congress has
stepped in to regulate the anarchy - to attempt to graft onto
cyberspace the concepts of geography and identity, or what Professor
Lessig has called "the architecture of real space."303 There are
many who prefer the Net as it is now, a world in which information flows freely across borders, but cannot be stopped by boundaries or walls. But make no mistake - zoning is coming to cyberspace. As Professor Lessig, who laments the trend, has noted, "the
Web is becoming a place where the discriminations of real space
get automated in a technology of zoning."304 The technology of zoning promises to be far more precise than any analog that exists
in real space. In contrast to legislative code, computer code
will someday infallibly discriminate in the distribution of, and
access to, pornography and other information on the Internet. 305
303. Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869,
886 (1996).
304. Lessig, 45 EMORY L.J. at 889.
305. Professor Lessig has noted that the trend toward perfect zoning is occurring on
the Internet without governmental intervention:
Quite without governmental mandate, and indeed, without anything like a centralized process of decision, cyberspace is already becoming something quite
different from what I have described. It is moving, that is, from a relatively
unzoned place to a universe that is extraordinarily well zoned. The architecture of cyberspace - the software that constitutes it - is becoming quite
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More succinctly put: "Law as code is a start to the perfect technology of justice."306
Unlike Professor Lessig and others, I am not troubled by the introduction of zoning into cyberspace. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
the anarchy that presently characterizes the Internet continuing in
perpetuity, particularly if the Internet is to become a democratic forum for the dissemination of information and a major vehicle for commerce. Governments patrol borders as an attribute of their
sovereignty, both to apprehend violators of the law and to control the
effects of materials that cross borders. 307 They cannot serve these
compelling interests without some means of exerting "physical" control over their subjects. The best means for doing so, whether in real
space or cyberspace, is to create and regulate effective boundaries and
walls.
As of yet, there are no definitive boundaries in cyberspace. Like
much else in cyberspace, the borders that exist are rather permeable
and rudimentary. The Internet's borders are largely the result of custom, and they have not yet hardened into boundaries or walls. Cyberspace customs are likely to change, however, and to do so with some
frequency and rapidity. In other words, the Net's architecture is
unsettled.
Nevertheless, just as cyberspace is taking shape, Congress has
stepped in with the CDA and COPA, two zoning laws through which
lawmakers sought to transport real space zoning principles to cyberspace. The difficulty with Congress's approach to the Internet's pornography dilemma to this point has been the prematurity of its
regulation. More fundamentally, it has been Congress's inability to
grasp just what it is regulating, and how technology - that other
"code" about which Professor Lessig has written so eloquently -limits its power to regulate cyberspace within the bounds of the First
Amendment.
This does not mean that Congress is forever foreclosed from regulating, or zoning, speech outside real space. As zoning comes to cyberspace, boundaries and walls will develop and Congress, along with the
states, will undoubtedly step in to exert some measure of control over
the materials crossing those boundaries. As Justice O'Connor noted
in her concurring opinion in Reno, one of the distinguishing features of
quickly far better at facilitating discriminations in access and distribution than
any equivalent technologies in real space.
ld. at 888.
306. Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1408 (1996).
307. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders- The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1369-70 (1996) (explaining why "geographic borders
for law make sense in the real world").
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the Internet is the malleability of its architecture. She stated: "Cyberspace is malleable. Thus, it is possible to construct barriers in cyberspace and use them to screen for identity, making cyberspace more
like the physical world and, consequently, more amenable to zoning
laws."308 Boundaries and walls can be constructed, torn down, re-configured and relocated with a few changes in the regulating computer
software. Formal and informal zones operate effectively in real space,
because features like geography and identity are found there. These
features, as their description in Part II demonstrates, are not found in
cyberspace- they are made. They have not been made yet, at least
not to an extent that renders them susceptible to speech restrictions
like the CDA and COPA. It is as if the government were framing the
portrait when the world was still painting the object to be framed.
Thus far, Congress has proceeded hastily in this rapidly developing and highly uncertain environment. Lawmakers have enough difficulty criminalizing speech in the settled architecture of the real world.
Congress raises the stakes significantly by forcing publishers in cyberspace to self-censor or suffer lengthy jail terms and heavy fines. This
is, fortunately, not the only course available. Indeed, if it is willing to
exercise some patience, Congress will find that it need not legislate
this type of broad, draconian zoning in order to be a meaningful participant in shaping the architecture of the Internet.
The first thing Congress ought to do before it takes up another
Internet censorship law is to become educated as to what it is regulating and the options available to it. Hopefully, the Commission Congress created when it passed COPA will thoroughly investigate the
Internet's existing architecture and recommend plausible means for
protecting children from "harmful" materials that are far less restrictive than COPA. It is unfortunate that the Commission was granted
only one year to conduct its study and report its findings to Congress.
As CDA and COPA demonstrate, the technological landscape may not
change appreciably during the next year. Advances in user-based
blocking software, rating systems, gateway technology, and domain
name structure, to name only a few of the rapidly ·developing areas,
are likely to require more incubation time to become effective alternatives to the censorship path Congress has charted thus far.
Like zoning in general, however, these changes are coming to the
Internet. It will be technological advances, not Congressional mandates, that will finally solve the Internet's intractable pornography
problem. Or, at least, it will be some cooperative effort between engineers and lawmakers that allows Congress to regulate speech on the
Internet within the bounds of the First Amendment. Congress' pri308. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 890 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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mary goal in COPA and the CDA was to mandate that Web publishers
discriminate in the access to pornography on the basis of user age. As
indicated in Part II, advances on two separate fronts hold out great
promise that the identity now missing from the Internet is forthcoming. Rating systems, like the PICS system, 309 are already being used
by many publishers oflnternet pornography. Similarly, domain name
proposals have been made that would establish a top-level domain for
pornographic materials. What is needed is the development of a consensus as to what ratings or domain name ought to be used, and what
materials ought to fall within the rated categories or domain. PICS
may well, in due time, provide that consensus as to ratings. In conjunction with the move to ratings and perhaps additional domains,
engineers continue to perfect user-based blocking software that will
permit parents to block rated or domain-speCific cybersmut with far
greater precision than Congress could ever hope to obtain through
legislation.
Of course, Congress cannot mandate that users purchase and install blocking software that will discriminate along the lines of an accepted rating system or domain name. But assuming some consensus
can be reached, Congress could encourage sites to rate their content or
place it within the chosen domain by punishing those who do not do
so. It might even, at some point, establish a ratings Commission,
along the lines of an FCC, to help forge some consensus as to the
proper ratings to use in cyberspace. In other words, Congress can require that publishers zone their own materials in order to deny minors
access to pornography on the Internet. This solution would resemble
the much-debated ''V-chip" for television. While it would raise complexities of its own, including the need to determine what content belongs where, the ratings and domain name solution would not be
constitutionally suspect.

c.

PARENTAL ZONING

There is another solution, however, that is even more attractive.
If one accepts, as I do, that parents should determine in the first instance what their children see on their home computer screen, then
user-based blocking software will provide the "perfect technology of
justice" of which Lessig writes. The software as it now exists allows
parents to block all manner of pornography, whether in the form of
images, words, or video, from their home computers. It is true that
this code sometimes screens too broadly for words like "breast," but
that seems a small price to pay in order to block the array of porno309. See supra note 104.
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graphic images and text that children may encounter, whether intentionally or by chance, on the Internet.
Blocking software is as easy to install as using an ATM card, and
is extremely difficult to disengage. Thus, unlike, say, credit card verification, it is a solution that children cannot easily end-run. In addition, user-based blocking software will be far more effective than
legislative fiat in another respect: it will enable parents to block
materials that are posted on overseas sites. Further, unlike COPA,
user-based blocking software blocks materials from non-profit as well
as commercial sites.
I have some sympathy for the argument that it is the
pornographers, not the parents, who ought to pay for the zoning of
pornography. But the price to be paid under statutes like the CDA
and COPA, including the debasement of the First Amendment and the
loss of the fluidity that makes the Internet a unique and exciting form
of communication, seems far greater than the modest sum concerned
parents must expend to zone pornography from the desktop.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For all its focus on the Reno decision, Congress missed the
Supreme Court's primary admonition that the legislature, rather than
return to the drafting table after the failure of the CDA, should exhibit
patience and allow the Internet's nascent technology to develop prior
to embarking on yet another attempt at Internet speech regulation.
In COPA, Congress did manage to improve upon the defects that
doomed the CDA. But the improvements failed to address the principle barrier to content-based regulation of speech on the Internet. As
yet, the characteristics of geography and identity that make possible
the zoning of speech in real space do not exist in cyberspace. Until the
technological state-of-the-art in cyberspace advances to meet the state
of real space First Amendment law, Congress's attempts to zone
speech in cyberspace will falter.
The most Congress can expect to accomplish in the current environment is passage of a narrowly drawn law that will place pornographic "teasers" beyond the reach of most children. As the Justice
Department pointed out before COPA was enacted, however, law enforcement resources are finite, and several statutes already prohibit
the communication of the most harmful materials to children. Under
the circumstances, Congress ought to practice the restraint urged
upon it by the Reno Court. Nothing Congress has done, or is likely to
do, can come close to matching the precision and effectiveness of the
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market solutions, such as user-based blocking software, being developed by engineers. When such projects reach fruition, we shall see
that the pornography problem on the Internet is not "intractable" after all.

